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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant theoretical advancements in the
legal academy is the recognition that law is not the only method of
social regulation. Other methods of social control include social
norms and architecture.1 This has led researchers in a variety of
disciplines to document how the architecture of information
technologies or code affects our online experiences and activities.2
The term “code” refers to the hardware and software components of
information technologies. This has also led to policymakers to
consider code-based as well as legal solutions to societal problems.3
The problems addressed include preventing crime,4 fostering
competition,5 limiting free speech,6 protecting privacy,7 increasing
1

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 95 (1999)
(noting the role of architecture and social norms). Among the most influential
works on social norms are Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization,
Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000); ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
2
See Paul DiMaggio et al., Social Implications of the Internet, 27 ANN. REV. OF
SOC. 307 (2001) (discussing the need for sociologists to attend to the architecture
of information technologies); CARL L. SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES (1998) (discussing how the architecture of information technologies can
affect informational economics); François Bar, The Construction of Marketplace
Architecture, in TRACKING A TRANSFORMATION: E-COMMERCE AND THE TERMS
OF COMPETITION IN INDUSTRIES (2001) (discussing how consumer choice and
market outcomes can be affected by the architecture of information technologies);
Andrew J. Flannigan et al., The Technical Code of the Internet/World Wide Web,
17 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 409 (2000) (discussing the role of the
architecture of information technologies for communication scholars).
3
Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002);
TIMOTHY D. CROWE, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (2d
ed. 2000).
4
Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003
(2001).
5
The open access movement is based upon the principle that the architecture can
support competition as well as providing a platform to support innovative
applications. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-To-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 925 (2001).
6
This Article discusses the use of architectural solutions for addressing the
problem of minors viewing inappropriate content. A number of commentators
have addressed this issue. Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech On
The Internet: A Legal And Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1999);
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997).
See also David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited
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security,8 ensuring fair use in copyright,9 and revitalizing democratic
discourse.10
In choosing architectural solutions, policymakers have had to
rely on their own insights and experiences.
There is no
comprehensive analysis of the various methods government can use
to reshape code. This article addresses this lacuna by building upon
previous work by Reidenberg and others in discussing how
government can influence the development of code.11 The resulting

Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325 (2001) (discussing approaches to limit
unsolicited bulk email); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 182-89 (2001) (proposing
the redesign of web sites to incorporate links of different viewpoints to provide
exposure to differing viewpoints).
7
An example of an architectural solution for privacy is the Preferences for Privacy
Project (P3P). See William McGeveran, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and
Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1813 (2001) (arguing for P3P as a solution
to privacy problems. See also Malla Pollack, Opt-In Government: Using the
Internet to Empower Choice—Privacy Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 653
(2001) (proposing the creation of a government search engine that only links to
web sites that protect a user’s privacy); Shawn H. Helms, Translating Privacy
Values With Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 288 (2001) (arguing the
government, privacy advocacy groups, and users should support the adoption of
privacy enhancing technologies).
8
President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace¸ available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/ (Sep. 2002)
(suggesting a number of architectural solutions for improving security).
9
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH 41 (2001) (providing an example of an
architectural solution to allow fair use in digital based intellectual property). The
media industry has been very vocal in supporting architectural solutions to
protection their intellectual property. Amy Harmon, Hearings on Digital Movies
and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/03/01/technology/01DIGI.html. See also, Michael J. Madison, Complexity
and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125 (2000) (using
the architectural metaphor to examine copyright law).
10
See ANTHONY G. WILHELM, DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 44-47 (2000);
Cathy Bryan et al., Electronic Democracy and the Civic Networking Movement in
Context, in CYBERDEMOCRACY 1 (Roza Tsagarousianou et al. eds., 1998).
11
Reidenberg explicitly addresses how public policy can change code. Joel
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 588-92 (1998). See also STUART
BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE (2001) (providing a broad framework for
regulating cyberspace). See generally David M. Hart, U.S. Technology Policy:
New Tools for New Times, NIRA REV., (1998), available at
http://www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/98summer/hart.html
(providing
a
good
summary of the various methods the government can use to shape the development
of technologies); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GOVERNMENT
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categorization defines various methods policymakers can use, while
also providing an analyzing the possibilities and limitations of each
approach.
The resulting framework allows policymakers to
encourage and proactively shape the development of code to meet a
variety of societal concerns, such as privacy, security, and
competition through the use of government’s regulatory and fiscal
powers.
While, this Article may seem unnecessary given the current
rhetoric that government must keeps its hands off the internet, U.S.
Department of Commerce General Counsel Andrew Pincus argues
that “the needs and dynamics of the marketplace, and not
governments, must guide standard development and implementation
activities. Governments should refrain from issuing technical
regulations and instead should rely, to the maximum extent possible,
on the private sector to self-regulate.”12 The reality is that
government has, is, and will be heavily involved in shaping the
development of code. For example, consider recent legislation on
unsolicited e-mail and regulations requiring cell phone number
portability.13 In addition to the proposals mentioned above, the
government is also involved in shaping the development of code for
reasons of antitrust,14 national security,15 protection of intellectual

INVOLVEMENT IN THE INNOVATION PROCESS (1978) (discussing various methods
for government to shape technologies).
12
Andre Pincus, General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, The Role of
Standards in Growth of the Global Electronic Commerce, Oct. 28, 1999, available
at http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/ecom1028.html.
13
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-127 (2004); Telephone Number Portability, CC Docket No.
95-116, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, FCC 03-284 (Nov. 10, 2003).
14
For example, in the Microsoft antitrust trial the government is attempting to
restrain Microsoft from using its code for illegal competitive advantages.
Microsoft has "commingled" the code of its Internet Explorer browser and the
Windows operating system to protect its monopoly power in violation of antitrust
laws. While the remedy is still unclear, the government is influencing the design
of code for the benefit of competition and ultimately consumers. The illegal
commingling was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. See Appeals court rejects Microsoft, government requests, ZDNET,
Aug. 2, 2001, available at http://www.zdnet.com/eweek/stories/general/
0,11011,2801117,00.html. See also Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once
Shame on You – Fool Us Twice Shame On Us: What We Can Learn From the
Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain Name System, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 195 (2001) (noting how government modified code for
competition during the privatization of the backbone network).
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property rights,16 accessibility,17 safety,18 and the labeling content.19
Since government regulation generally seeks to prevent harm and
15

For national security reasons, the government has restricted the sale of code. See
Steven B. Winters & John A. Blomgren, How the US Government Controls
Technology, 19 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2002). The U.S. Government
restricted the export of code containing strong encryption until 2000. This law led
to companies, such as Netscape, having to market a weaker encryption version of
their browser for download outside of the United States. In January 2000, a new
encryption policy allowed the export of strong encryption in programs to most of
the world. David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on
Encryption Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/01/biztech/articles/13export.html.
Relatedly, the government eased export restrictions on the fastest computers. John
Markoff, White House Eases Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/technology/11EXPO.html.
Despite the
terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government is not planning to require "backdoors" that
would allow government access to encrypted communications.
Declan
McCullagh, Senator Backs Off Backdoors, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 17, 2001, available
at http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47635,00.html.
16
To protect intellectual property rights, the government uses both civil and
criminal penalties. The government effectively shut down the music-trading
program Napster for copyright violations. John Borland, Database "upgrades"
keep Napster down, CNET NEWS.COM, July 6, 2001, available at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-6443598.html. The government attempted
prosecuting a programmer who wrote a program that circumvented Adobe's Ebook format. Amy Harmon & Jennifer Lee, Arrest Raises Stakes in Battle Over
Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001; Roger Parloff, Free Dmitry? Spare Me:
Why the FBI Was Right to Arrest the Internet's Latest Martyr, INSIDE.COM, Aug.
01,
2001,
available
at
http://www.inside.com/product/Product.asp?pf_
id=%7BE8EECFA3-CBD1-447E-952C-CC16283D266C%7D
(providing
an
excellent review of the facts and circumstances around Dmitry Sklyarov's arrest).
17
The government regulates the design of code for accessibility as a form of public
welfare. For example, the government has required television manufacturers to
incorporate closed captioning for the hearing impaired. Closed Caption Decoder
Requirements for Television Receivers, 47 C.F.R. § 15.119 (2002); The FCC page
on closed captioning is at http://www.fcc.gov/cib/dro/caption.html. Similarly,
regulations require that federal agencies must become disability friendly. This has
created demand for code that allows the development of accessible web sites.
Carrie Johnson, A More Accessible Web, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2000, at E01.
18
The FAA and the FDA regulate the development of code for the safety of
society. See Leslie A. (Schad) Johnson, DO-178B, Software Considerations in
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, CROSSTALK, Oct. 1998, available
at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/1998/oct/schad.asp (focusing on DO-17B
rules); George Romanski, The Challenges of Software Certification, CROSSTALK,
Sep. 2001, available at http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2001/sep/romanski.asp
(discussing how to ensure safe air transportation while using computer controlled
systems). Similarly, the FDA also regulates medical device software for the
benefit of public safety. These regulations require developers to use accepted
software engineering practices during the development process to ensure the
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promote benefits such as innovation, regulating with code is
analogous to the architectural regulation found in buildings and
cities,20 transportation,21 the environment,22and biotechnology.23
Discussed herein are various measures government can use to
shape the development of code. For each measure, we identify and
discuss regulatory and technological issues that affect its
effectiveness. The result is a more informed approach in weighing
the alterative approaches to shaping code. We do not attempt to
determine the comparative efficiency of different approaches to
shaping code, because, in part, that analysis is a factually laden
inquiry depending on the specific characteristics and issues related to
the particular type of code in question. Generally, government
becomes involved when societal concerns are not being addressed in
the marketplace and often uses a combination of these approaches to
shape code.
This article contributes to three different literatures. First, it
provides the regulatory literature with a work that is tailored to
information technologies. It does this by largely building upon
Justice Breyer’s seminal work on regulatory theory.24 The result is a
framework that provides a comprehensive approach for regulating
the Internet. Second, this article contributes to the emerging
software will operate properly. Quality System Regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 820
(1999); FDA, Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions for Software
Contained in Medical Devices, available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/57.html
(May 29, 1998); John K. Suzuki, Documenting the Software Validation of
Computer-Controlled Devices and Manufacturing Processes: A Guide for Small
Manufacturers, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY MAG., (Jan. 1996),
available at http://www.devicelink.com/mddi/archive/96/01/023.html (providing
an overview of the process).
19
. The government has required television manufacturers to incorporate the "Vchip" which allows parents to block inappropriate television programs.
Requirement for Manufacture of Televisions that Block Programs, 47 U.S.C. §
303(x) (2001); The FCC page on the V-Chip is at http://www.fcc.gov/
vchip/legislation.html. Similarly, legislation requires public libraries funded by
federal funds to install software to block obscene or pornographic images. See
United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
20
This literature encompasses urban planning through zoning and architecture
through building codes. See JOHN LEVY, CONTEMPORARY URBAN PLANNING
(1999); INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (2000).
21
ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 155-56 (1986).
22
PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(1994).
23
MICHAEL J. MALINOWSKI, BIOTECHNOLOGY:
LAW, BUSINESS, AND
REGULATION (1999).
24
STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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literature on using code as a regulatory mechanism. With this
approach, code is used to modify or limit behavior, instead of relying
upon users to limit their behavior because of legal sanctions. In the
process of developing our framework, we highlight numerous ways
in which code is or can be used by government as a regulatory
mechanism. Third, this article contributes to the communications
literature by highlighting how government shapes the medium of
cyberspace. While communications scholars have focused on how
code is developed, little attention has been focused on the myriad of
ways government has traditionally shaped communications
technologies to address societal concerns. 25
This Article is organized in four parts. Part II discusses how
government can use its regulatory power to shape code; specifically,
prohibitions on code, using standards or market-based incentives,
modifying liability, and requiring disclosure. We also argue that
government needs to develop a comprehensive regulatory strategy
for code. Part III discusses fiscal measures government can utilize,
including government funding of research and development, the use
of the government’s procurement power, tax expenditures, and
funding of education and training. In Part IV, we analyze how
government can shape code through intellectual property rights. We
discuss this in a general sense and then focus on compulsory
licensing and technology transfer issues.
II. SHAPING CODE THROUGH REGULATORY METHODS
It is well established that government can and should shape
code with its regulatory power.26 This section provides a framework
25

Much of the communication literature focuses on how corporations shape the
medium. VINCENT MOSCO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMUNICATION:
RETHINKING AND RENEWAL (1996); Robert McChesney, The Political Economy of
Global Communication, in CAPITALISM AND THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (Robert
McChesney et al. eds., 1998). But newer work recognizes other institutions, such
as the open source movement, in the development of communication technologies.
Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALE J. L. & TECH.
(forthcoming 2004).
26
Considerable support has amassed for the principle that government has a role in
regulating the Internet. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 201-02; Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory,
88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000); Reidenberg, supra note 11; Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C.
Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You – Fool Us Twice Shame On Us: What We Can
Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the Domain
Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo,
Neither Bottom-Up Nor Top-Down: A Tacit Public Private Cooperative Solution
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of various regulatory tools and analyzes how they may be used to
shape code. We do not attempt to formulate a simplistic model for
how government should shape code. Instead, we attempt to provide
a framework to highlight some of the critical issues that must be
addressed when using any specific regulatory approach. This
approach is preferable to a simplistic formulistic approach that is
bound to fail due to numerous and varied factors prevalent in any
attempted government regulation.27
Government may employ its regulatory power in five
different ways to influence the development of code; all of which
regulate harmful technology. Table 1, below, lists a brief synopsis of
each regulatory method.
Method
Prohibit
Code

One word
summation
Ban

Rationale
Harm is unacceptable at
any level

Set
standards

Stick

Require the use of
technologies to reduce
the harm

Marketbased
regulation

Carrot

Limit the harm by
making it more costly
(taxes) or by limiting its
quantity (property rights)

Examples of codebased regulation
Digital Millennium
Copyright Action ban
on anti-circumvention
code
Transmitting obscene
content to minors
across
the Internet
Closed captioning and
V-Chip
Requiring filtering
software
Digital broadcasting
Creation of property,
e.g., domain names
and IP addresses

for Internet Regulation (forthcoming); Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the
State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to
“Private Regulation”, 71 COLO. L. REV. 1263 (2000); Henry H. Peritt, Towards a
Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001);
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998).
Even libertarians agree that the government may have a role in regulating the
Internet. See David Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000).
27
See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 4-11 (1982)
(discussing the rationale for using a framework approach in his work on
government regulation).
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One word
summation
Lawsuits

Method
Modify
liability

Disclosure

Warnings

Rationale
Encourage development
of safer products

Inform society about the
harm

Examples of codebased regulation
Advocated for
increasing security,
and part
of the concern with
UTICA
Labeling requirements
for commercial email
Disclosure security
violations in computer
systems in California
CERT coordination
center for informing
users about security
issues

Table 1. Regulatory methods for addressing harms
A. Prohibiting Code
Unlike regulation, which allows a certain level of a
technology or activity, a prohibition holds there is no acceptable
level within society.28 Prohibited technologies and activities can
involve national security, public safety, and environmental
concerns,29 e.g., the Communications Decency Act of 1996
attempted to prohibit the transmission of indecent and obscene
material to minors.30 In this section, we first present the chief
criticisms of the government’s use of prohibition as a regulatory
mechanism. The remainder of the section addresses these criticisms
and shows how prohibitions can shape code.
28

We are focusing on prohibitions that actively shape code and not prohibitions
that are focused on competition. In telecommunications, the government has long
prohibited certain firms from engaging in certain activities to foster competition.
For example, not allowing the baby Bells into the long distance market until they
allow for competition in the local market. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the
Giant: How the Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers,
and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1999) (describing how competitive
restrictions on AT&T shaped code).
29
For example, banning of predatory fish, such as the snakehead fish. Here the
government is saying, that it is in the interest of society that people do not have
access to these fish. The potential costs to society are too great. See Anita Huslin,
At Last, U.S. Hopes, Snakehead is History, WASH POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at B4
(discussing a forthcoming ban on snakehead fish).
30
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1997).
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The use of government prohibition has three major criticisms.
First, since a prohibition does not allow for potentially beneficial
uses, it is not an economically efficient means of regulation because
its cost is much higher than its benefit.31 Critics suggest that a less
costly approach would be to use regulation with standards or require
the use of product warnings. A second criticism, high cost, arises
because the easy reproduction and transmission of code in a software
format makes enforcement difficult. As an example, in the DeCSS
case, members of the hacker community distributed a program that
deciphered the encryption used to protect DVDs.32 In a short time,
this code spread across the world and is still readily available despite
the efforts of the movie industry to stifle its distribution. The final
criticism results from the negative effect of prohibition on
innovation. By not allowing the development or sale of a
technology, the government closes off a path for future research and
development. This is especially pertinent to emerging areas of
technological development and has been used widely in the recent
debate over the use of stem cells. Proponents of stem cell research
argue that limiting research could stifle the development of
lifesaving medical breakthroughs.33
Despite these criticisms, prohibitions can be an efficient
means of regulation. A prohibition is efficient when the cost of no
prohibition to society greatly outweighs the needs of some citizens.34
In these cases, society cannot permit the needs of a select few to
outweigh those of the entire society.35 Because regulations serve to
provide an acceptable level of a technology or activity within
society, when no such a balance is acceptable, prohibition becomes
necessary. For example, the standard for banning a product by the
31

James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64
(1970).
32
David M. Ewalt, DeCSS Case Could Change Your IT Shop,
INFORMATIONWEEK, July 16, 2001, available at http://www.informationweek.
com/story/IWK20010711S0010.
33
Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health, Stem Cells: A Primer,
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/primer.htm (last visited Aug. 3,
2002).
34
The cost here is not purely economic cost, but social cost. There are many
prohibitions based on moral grounds, such as human cloning. Many technologies
associated with reproduction are prohibited or heavily regulated, for example stem
cell research and cloning. See Vernon J. Ehlers, The Case Against Human
Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 523 (1999).
35
See DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 44 (1990) (arguing that product bans are
useful when the social costs clearly exceeds the social benefits).
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Consumer Product Safety Commission is if “no feasible consumer
product safety standard . . . would adequately protect the public from
the unreasonable risk of injury.”36 Society has banned each of the
following technologies: polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),37
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs),38 and, without suggesting an
equivalence amongst these examples, anti-circumvention code.39
A prohibition’s enforcement costs are generally much lower
than other regulatory actions. It is much simpler to enforce a ban on
all uses of a technology rather than limiting a single product or
activity. Since it is much more difficult to ensure a product is only
being used or sold for its “permitted” use, once government allows
such use, enforcement costs rise. Availability of substitutes is
another factor that can lower the cost of enforcement. Substitutes
that impose lower social costs can reduce demand for the prohibited
product, thus easing enforcement of the prohibition. However, the
lack of substitutes and continuing high demand for the prohibited
product risk the creation of an illegal market. Looking at the
ongoing drug war, the lack of substitutes for narcotics and the high
demand has led to the formation of a vast illegal market. Thus, our
analysis suggests that prohibitions are most efficient when enforced
broadly across society and when users have access to substitute
products.
Prohibitions on code can lead to high enforcement costs
because of the ease of reproduction and transmission of code.
Nonetheless, prohibitions on code are not useless.
Rather,
prohibition can still drastically limit the use of a technology through
its effect on law-abiding individuals and firms. While there may be
elements of society that bypass the prohibition, prohibitions can
substantially reduce the social costs of undesired technology. This is
true of intellectual property rights, which the government has
protected by making it illegal to develop anti-circumvention code.40
As a result, there are no legitimate firms selling such code.41 While
36

15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1976). See also Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of
Cancer Risks in Consumer Products, 67 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1981) (examining the
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s regulation of carcinogens).
37
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (e).
38
Consumer Products Safety Commission, Regulations for Self-Pressurized
Consumer Products Containing Chlorofluorocarbons, 16 C.F.R. § 1401.
39
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2001).
40
Id.
41
In the earlier days of personal computing, a popular genre was copy programs
that circumvented copy protection. For example, LockSmith was a commercially
available program that allowed its users to copy programs that were copy
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this has not stopped the development of anti-circumvention code, the
prohibition has severely limited distribution of this code out of
concern for the potential liability exposure.42 Similarly, prohibiting
unsolicited email is not expected to solve the problem, but rather
provide another means of reducing unsolicited email.43
We find it difficult to apply enforcement cost analysis to the
government’s restriction on the export of encryption technology.
While the government historically restricted the export of encryption
technology,44 it has recently relaxed its export regulations and
allowed the export of encryption technology.45 The major exception
to this policy is the prohibition against exports to Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.46 Enforcement costs increase
both because this prohibition is a limited one,47 and because
prohibited encryption technologies are readily available. We see an
example of this is in export regulations which allow firms to publicly
post their code on the web for download. According to the
regulations, this is not considered a knowing export and is thus
permissible, even though anyone, including people in the prohibited
countries, can download the code.48 Additionally, the lack of
substitutes drives up enforcement costs. In fact, there are no
substitutes or alternatives to alleviate the social costs arising from
encryption technology which allow terrorists and criminal
protected. This was a legitimate need, as many software publishers would not
provide a backup or replacement copy of the software if the disk became
unreadable. See Donald W. Larson, User Land Discussion Archive, Tales of Woz's
Genius,
(July
7,
2000),
available
at
http://static.userland.com/
userLandDiscussArchive/msg018908.html.
42
This can be seen in the efforts to place alternative programs and operating
systems on Microsoft’s Xbox gaming console.
While individuals have
circumvented the Xbox’s security systems, this code has not been publicly
distributed. See David Becker, MIT Student Hacks into Xbox, CNET NEWS.COM,
(June 3, 2002), available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-931296.html; David
Becker, “Mod Chip” for Hacking Xbox Discontinued, CNET NEWS.COM, (June 26,
2002), available at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-939591.html.
43
Jonathan Krim, Anti-Spam Act Signed But Some Are Skeptical, WASH POST,
Dec. 17, 2003, at A18.
44
Peter H. Lewis, Privacy For Computers? Clinton Sets the Stage For a Debate on
Data Encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 11, 1995, at D7.
45
See supra note 15.
46
Revisions and Clarifications to Encryption Controls in the Export
Administration Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 38, 855 (June 6, 2002).
47
For example, this provision is found in the license of the Netscape browser.
Netscape, Netscape Browser Distribution Program License Agreement, available
at http://wp.netscape.com/bisdev/distribution/start.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2002).
48
Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 15.740.13(e)(6).
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organizations to conceal their communications.49 The government
did attempt to solve this problem with the Clipper chip, but the effort
failed.50 All of the aforementioned factors combine to create high
enforcement costs, suggesting that current policy is not practical.51
Prohibitions can also provoke innovation and provide an
impetus for research and development.52 Conversely, prohibiting
technologies in emerging industries can reduce innovation.53
Research has shown that prohibitions have varying effects upon the
development of substitutes by the existing “insider” firms within an
industry. However, prohibitions can lead to new “outsider” firms
developing technologically innovative substitutes.54 One method of
minimizing the impact of prohibitions upon innovation and
encouraging the creation of substitutes is a gradual phasing out of the
technology. The government implemented just such a policy by
phasing out the production of CFCs thereby allowing the
development of alternatives materials.55
An example of a code-based prohibition that could have
provoked technological change is the now unconstitutional part of
the CDA, which banned the transmission of indecent content to
minors over the Internet. Without challenging the holding, based
49

While lesser strength encryption products are not prohibited, they are not
adequate substitutes for terrorist or criminal organizations. This is because the
government is able to decrypt communications protected by these weaker products.
See Daniel Verton, DOD: Encryption Export Troubling, FED. COMPUTER WK.,
(July 12, 1999).
50
The Clipper chip was an encryption technology that left a “back door” for the
government to eavesdrop on communications. However, it met with opposition
and was never adopted. See LAURA J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN
CYBERSPACE: THE ONLINE PROTESTS OVER LOTUS MARKETPLACE AND THE
CLIPPER CHIP (1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709,
752-59 (1995).
51
While this policy is ineffectual from the standpoint of enforcement costs, there
are other reasons why it may still be necessary. In this case, this policy is part of
the Wassenaar Arrangement, which seeks to regulate dual-use technologies. See
Revisions and Clarifications to Encryption Controls in the Export Administration
Regulations, supra note 46.
52
Nicholas Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation,
9 HARV. ENVIRON. L. REV. 419 (1985).
53
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A
USER’S GUIDE 100 (1995).
54
Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention and Environmental
Regulation, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38-39 (1997) (discussing Ashford’s
research).
55
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 53, at 99-100.

14

correctly on the First Amendment, this prohibition could have
accelerated the development of verification technologies to identify
minors and filtering programs that ensure minors do not access
indecent content. These technologies would have arisen as a
byproduct of the large amount of indecent content accessible over the
Internet.56 Web sites would have supported technologies that
allowed them to continue to provide indecent material. Minors, with
limited economic resources, would have found it difficult to find the
same material using alternate channels. This illustrates how the
CDA could have used society-wide prohibition to shape the
development of code.
B. Setting Standards: The Command and Control Approach
Government can shape the development of code by using
standards mandating the technological requirements for code. This
direct approach has traditionally been known as the command and
control approach, with the government acting as both the enforcer
and the standard-setter. This approach is often contrasted with the
use of market-based incentives, discussed in the following section.57
The government shapes three types of standards. The first category
includes standards that promote transactions, interconnection, and
interoperability.58 Many code-based standards are of this type.
Examples of these include standards for wireless communication,
56

A new version of the CDA is now attempting to pass constitutional muster.
Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998)
(requiring sites that are harmful to minors to use an age verification barrier). It is
being challenged. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F. 3d 162 (3rd Cir.
2000). See http://www.epic.org/free_speech/copa/ (providing further supporting
documents).
57
See infra Part II.C.
58
These types of standards are known as process standards. Process standards
facilitate transactions, such as standards for bills of lading. See Office of
Technology Assessment, supra note 59, at 100. An important code-based process
standard is for interconnection. Government can use interconnection standards for
a number of purposes including facilitating competition. See Kesan & Shah, supra
note 26, at 205 (discussing interconnection standards for the competition in
telecommunications); Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard-setting, and
Self-Regulation, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 822 (discussing when government should
regulate by mandating open, interoperable standards). Interconnection can even
aid law enforcement. For example, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act requires telecommunication firms to ensure their infrastructure
allows for wiretapping by law enforcement. Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994).
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such as 802.11b, or for commerce, such as Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL). The second category includes product standards, which
provide information about a product’s characteristics.59 The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses just such a standard in its
labeling system for food.60 A third type of standard protects against
societal hazards or problems.61 These safety-oriented standards are
commonly used in environmental and transportation regulation. In
this section we first discuss how technologically forward-looking the
government should be in its regulatory efforts. Next, we discuss the
different methods government can use in mandating standards.
1. Technology-Forcing
Technology forcing, an important issue in standard-setting,
refers to regulatory efforts that direct the development of
technologies along specific paths.62 The standards force firms to
either innovate or diffuse technologies. In the case of innovation, the
government attempts to force the creation of new technologies.
When using diffusion, the government forces firms to incorporate
59

Product standards contain information on the characteristics of the products.
This information allows for product identification, interoperability, and quality
control. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GLOBAL
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 99 (1992). Government
mandated product standards are discussed in more detail in a later section on the
disclosure of code’s characteristics. See infra Part II.E.
60
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD STANDARDS AND LABELING POLICY
BOOK (1998).
61
An example of a control standard is the quality requirements for automobile
tires. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, New Pneumatic Tires -Passenger Cars manufactured after 1948, Part 571, Standard No. 109 (requiring
every tire to have information encoded on the sidewall specifying temperature,
speed, load, traction, and tread-life ratings). An example of a control standard for
code is the requirement for televisions to incorporate closed captioning. Television
Decoder Circuitry Act, Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (codified at 47 U. S. C.
§ 303 (u), § 330 (b) (1990)) (regarding closed captioning); Sy Dubow, The
Television Decoder Circuitry Act—TV for All, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 609 (1991).
Another example is the FCC’s regulation of radio frequency devices. Marketing of
Radio-Frequency Devices, 47 C.F.R. § 2.801 (2001). See also Christopher
Smallwood, FCC Regulation of Computers, COMPUTER LAW, (Mar. 1992), at 25.
Control standards may also be used during the production of code. For example,
the FAA and the FDA both use control standards to ensure the development
process for code meets strict quality assurance guidelines. See supra note 18.
62
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, n. 18 (1987) (defining technologyforcing).
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existing technologies into their products. This use of technologyforcing regulation has varied by industry. Early automobile
regulation used a significant amount of technology-forcing
regulation while building code regulations contain little technologyforcing aspects.63
The first part of this section discusses and addresses
criticisms of government’s use of technology-forcing regulation to
shape the development of code. The second part discusses codebased
technology-forcing
regulation
and
analyzes
the
Communications Decency Act from a technology-forcing
perspective, providing insight into the failure of the CDA from a
legal and technological standpoint.
In using technology-forcing regulation, a regulator must
consider a number of criticisms.64 First, why is government directing
the development of technologies in specific areas? Critics argue this
approach is ineffective, and the government can use other methods,
such as market incentives, to shape technologies. Second, how is
government able to accurately set technology-forcing regulations?
The development of technologies is unpredictable and unforeseen.65
Additionally, government has an even harder task in ascertaining
technical advances than firms because it depends upon firms sharing
state-of-the-art information. Such firms have an incentive to
withhold and mislead the government to ensure that technologyforcing standards are lax and easily met. A final problem with
63

Richard R. Nelson, Government Stimulus of Technological Progress: Lessons
from American History, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS 451, 472
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982). See also Eric Lipton & James Glanz, Sweeping
Changes Pushed For Code On City High-Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A1
(noting how building codes are slow to change and incorporate new technologies
such as sprinkler systems).
64
A number of commentators have criticized technology-forcing regulation. See
STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 106-07 (1982); Robert A.
Leone, Technology-Forcing Public Policies and the Automobile, in ESSAYS IN
TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND POLITICS: A HANDBOOK IN HONOR OF JOHN
R. MEYER 291 (Jose A. Gomez-Ibanez et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that we must
consider alternatives to technology-forcing); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in
Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1061-67 (1983) (noting the problems with
technology-forcing regulation); see infra note 104 (providing further criticisms on
the use of technology-forcing for environmental standards. But see infra note 105
(providing a response from supporters of technology-forcing regulation).
65
Nelson, supra note 63, at 454 (noting the uncertainty of technological advance
based on a number of case studies); Robert W. Lucky, Pondering the
Unpredictability of the Sociotechnical System, in ENGINEERING AS A SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE 89 (Hedy E. Sladovich ed., 1991).
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technology-forcing regulation is compliance costs. The more radical
a change is, the higher the cost to industry, and the greater the
incentive for firms to limit the regulations. Instead of developing or
diffusing new technologies, this can lead to firms that try to reduce
their costs by regulatory capture and litigation.66
In addressing the criticisms listed above, a policymaker must
first justify the use of a technology-forcing regulation. In deciding to
use a technology-forcing regulation, a regulator uses a stick approach
rather than a carrot approach.67 Both the inefficiency of marketbased incentives and their politically unfeasibility favor technologyforcing regulation.
Technology-forcing regulations can be more efficient than
market-based regulatory programs in two situations.68 The first
situation occurs when there are no existing technologies that address
a societal concern. In this case, industry must be forced to develop
new technologies.69 For example, in passing the Clean Air Act,
Congress was addressing public health concerns with little regard to
technological or economic limitations.70 A second situation occurs
66

Another problem is obsolete technology-forcing standards. Since Congress does
not revise regulations, periodically technology-forcing standards may become not
feasible or in need of revision. This then shifts the problem of setting and
enforcing these regulations to courts. Carolyn McNiven, Using Severability
Clauses to Solve the Attainment Deadline Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80
CALIF. L. REV. 1255 (1992) (suggesting courts be given the power through
severability clauses to remove obsolete deadlines).
67
Leone, supra note 64, at 303.
68
See infra Part II.C (discussing market-based regulatory programs).
69
"[F]or some pollutants in particular industries there may be no existing or
theoretical control technology; the control of pollution will then require the
development of entirely new control equipment or manufacturing processes-that is,
it will be necessary to force major technological innovation." La Pierre, supra note
70, at 773 (1977).
70
During the passage of the Clean Air Act, Senator Muskie the manager of the
Senate bill stated, “The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of
technological or economic judgments or even to be limited by what is or appears to
be technologically or economically feasible. Our responsibility is to establish what
the public interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may mean that
people and industries will be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the
present time." 116 Cong.Rec. 32901-32902 (1970). But see D. Bruce La Pierre,
Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 771, 837 (1977) (noting that although health-based standards can induce
major innovation, the EPA and courts have favored technology-based standards
that take into account economic constraints). Several commentators have written
about the technology-forcing aspects of the Clean Air Act. See Bonine, The
Evolution of Technology Forcing In The Clean Air Act, ENVIR. REP. (BNA)
(Monograph No. 21) (1975); Russell V. Randle, Forcing Technology: The Clean
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when the technology exists, but the technology cost is low while the
monitoring cost is high.71 In this situation, technology-forcing
regulation is more efficient than a market-based regulatory program.
The second situation involves technology-forcing regulations which
can be justified based on political expediency, because they provide
a clear objective, a direct method, and a tangible outcome for
legislators.72 In contrast to this approach, addressing market
externalities with market incentives can be politically difficult.
Economists use this line of reasoning when arguing that the best
method for increasing automobile fuel efficiency is a gasoline tax.
However, since no politician will support such a measure,73 instead
society has had to rely on technology-forcing regulations for
improved fuel efficiency.74
Setting technology-forcing standards is a significant issue
when the government requires firms to develop new technologies
because of the unpredictability of technological advances.75 In this
situation, standard-setting proves difficult because it is not clear what
the cost to the firms will be for developing the technology.76
Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J. 1713 (1979). This issue was recently visited by
the Supreme Court. The Court held that the government is not required to consider
financial impact when setting air quality standards. Justice Breyer’s concurrence
explicitly noted the validity of the technology-forcing nature of the Clean Air Act.
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903
(2001).
71
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory
Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WISC. L. REV. 887, 937 (1999).
72
Leone, supra note 64, at 295.
73
In contrast, Europe has used taxes as a regulatory tool. See Charles D. Patterson,
Environmental Taxes and Subsidies: What Is the Appropriate Fiscal Policy For
Dealing with Modern Environmental Problems, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 121, 167 (2000) (noting the popularity of taxes in other countries).
74
Technology-forcing standards can focus an industry’s attention on a problem in
a direct way. For example, in theory automakers historically have always had an
interest in auto safety as a way differentiating their products and selling more cars.
But in reality, it took Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed and subsequent
legislation to focus the automakers on the issue of safety. See Leone, supra note
64, at 302, 310.
75
See Nelson, supra note 65.
76
See Eban Goodstein, Polluted Data, AM. PROSPECT, (Nov. 1997) (arguing that
industry often inflates its estimated costs of complying with technology-forcing
regulation). For example, the Clean Air Act was not concerned about the current
level of technological feasibility. Its goal was to radically advance the state-of-theart technology for reducing air pollution. See supra note 70. The issue of
technology-forcing regulation was recently visited by the Supreme Court. The
Court held that the government is not required to consider financial impact when
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Consequently, in setting technology-forcing regulation, it is
necessary for regulators to gather the relevant expertise to understand
the state-of-the-art information as well as to understand the
industry’s history in technological innovation.77 However, if a
government agency cannot gather the necessary information or
legislators are concerned about regulatory capture during the
information gathering process, an alternative method of regulation
may be necessary.78
A related issue concerns the need for government to have a
clear understanding of the harm it is trying to prevent or the benefit it
is trying to produce.79 Examining automotive safety regulations, one
can see that it unclear as to how much harm the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) wishes to prevent.80 This
example is directly analogous to the issues facing code developers.
In order for code-based technology-forcing regulation to be
successful, it must be clear what societal concerns are being
addressed. Without this clarity, an agency would quickly run into
problems persuading the public and firms that its regulations created
societal benefits.
Another issue technology-forcing regulation must confront is
compliance. Firms are motivated to avoid compliance in a direct
setting air quality standards. Justice Breyer’s concurrence explicitly noted the
validity of the technology-forcing nature of the Clean Air Act. Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 121 S.Ct. 903 (2001).
77
See Ashford, supra note 52, at 422.
78
The probability of capture is higher because the government must closely
interact with firms for information on their capabilities.
79
In setting technology-forcing regulation, the regulator must consider the efficacy
of the proposed regulation. The standard for efficacy depends upon whether the
regulation is focused on forcing firms to create new technologies or incorporating
existing technology into their products. In the first case, a regulator is trying to
foster innovation. Therefore, the regulation should be focused on bottlenecks to
technological development. For example, in the case of electric vehicles being
pursued as a method of reducing pollution, Leone argues that technology-forcing
regulations have revealed bottlenecks in power plant emission control, lead battery
recycling, and consumer learning. Therefore, he believes that technology-forcing
regulations for electric vehicles are wasteful. The issues are different when
requiring firms to incorporate existing technologies into their products. In this
case, the government is concerned with widely diffusing a technology. The
success of this method hinges upon the cost of the technology that can be reduced
over time. This requires firms to have either an incentive for continued innovation
or economies of scale to reduce costs. Leone, supra note 64, at 320
80
Should an automobile survive a 30 m.p.h. head-on crash or a 50 m.p.h. crash?
Michael J. Trebilcock, Requiem for Regulators: The Passing of a CounterCulture?, 8 Y. J. REG. 497, 505-06 (1991)
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proportion to the cost of the technology-forcing regulation. As such,
ensuring that firms comply and develop or diffuse the necessary
technology requires a determined regulator. Absent such a regulator,
firms will try to delay or reduce technology-forcing regulation. After
all, technology-forcing regulation relies upon a stick as opposed to a
carrot approach. At times, delay may be the prudent course for
society. However, if firms are generally successful in using this
tactic it effectively neutralizes the use of technology-forcing
regulation.
Regardless of the difficulties found in implementing it,
technology-forcing regulation has led to numerous innovations,81
including improved environmental quality,82 safer automobiles,83
cleaner automobile emissions,84 and improved disclosure.85 For
81

See Ashford et al. supra note 52, (providing a number of examples of how
technology-forcing regulation led to innovation).
82
See Nicholas A. Ashford, An Innovation-Based Strategy for a Sustainable
Environment, in INNOVATION-ORIENTED ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 67, 85
(Kemmelskamp et al. eds., 2000).
83
Technology-forcing regulation has led to many safety improvements including
seat belts, air bags, and bumpers. These regulations have been acknowledged as
successful, because the savings in safety outweighed the regulatory costs. See
ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET. AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 155-56 (1986).
84
Technology-forcing regulations have led to internal combustion engines that
emit ninety six percent less emissions. This type of reduction was thought to be
infeasible when the regulations were first mandated. However, the overall
assessment of this effort is mixed, because while there are lower automotive
emissions, it is not clear whether this has led to clear improvements in public
health. See CRANDALL, supra note 83, at 156-57 (arguing that the costs of
emission regulation are higher than its benefits). Moreover, it is not clear whether
there were other options, such as emissions fees, that could have led to the same
technical advances. See Leone, supra note 64, at 292. For others, the development
of new technologies such as catalytic exhaust treatment and low-emission vehicles
show the merit of technology-forcing regulation. See Ashley Morris Bale, The
Newest Frontier in Motor Vehicle Emission Control: The Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213 (1995).
85
The Securities and Exchange Commission mandates that companies file their
documents electronically through EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval system. This system accelerates “the receipt, acceptance,
dissemination, and analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the
agency.” The goal is to “increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities
market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy.” Important
Information About EDGAR, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm
(last modified June 28, 1999). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of United
States Securities Regulation: An Essay on Regulation in an Age of Technological
Uncertainty, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 83 (2001) (arguing that EDGAR is an example
of how the SEC is changing from a technology-forcing strategy to a reactive or
obstructionist strategy because the SEC has not updated EDGAR).
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example, the development of the automobile airbag resulted from the
development of standards for a "passive occupant restraint system.”
These NHTSA developed these new standards in the late 1960s.
While industry fought this requirement, eventually such technology
was developed and has since become standard equipment on
automobiles.86 Nonetheless, the NHTSA has moved away from a
technology-forcing regulatory approach toward a more reactive
approach in automobile regulation.87
There are numerous examples of code-based technologyforcing regulation: filtering software,88 closed captioning,89 v-chip,90
accessibility,91 enhanced 911,92 and digital broadcasting.93 While a
86

See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
49 (1983) (noting the technology-forcing nature of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act
for automobile airbags).
87
A reason for the failure of technology-forcing regulation is the judicial system.
The NHTSA began by using technology-forcing rulemaking. However, over time
the NHTSA has moved toward a reactive strategy based largely around safety
defects. It has been argued that this occurred largely because of judicial secondguessing. See Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of
Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2000). See generally
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 69105 (1990) (documenting the changes in NHTSA from technology-forcing to a
more reactive regulation strategy); P. LORANG & L. LINDEN, AUTOMOBILE SAFETY
REGULATION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 149-54
(1977) (discussing NHTSA's difficulties with forcing manufacturers to develop
new technologies).
88
Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(A) (2001); Cole &
Grossman, supra note 71.
89
The incorporation of closed captioning technology was similar to the
incorporation of the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) tuner. Before government
regulation, consumers were forced to buy an expensive stand-alone decoder. See
DuBow, supra note 61 (providing a history of legislative process to require
manufacturers to incorporate closed captioning).
90
The V-chip was a relatively simply technology based on the modification of the
closed captioning technology. See Kristen S. Burns, Protecting the Child: The VChip Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART &
ENT. L. & POL’Y 143 (1996); Lisa D. Cornacchia, The V-Chip: A Little Thing But a
Big Deal, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 385 (2001).
91
The Telecommunications Act requires manufacturers of telecommunication
products and services to make their products and services accessible whenever it is
"readily achievable". Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 255 (1996).
92
In 1996, the FCC adopted regulations that require wireless carriers to deliver 911
calls and provide the location of the wireless emergency call. To meet these
regulations, wireless carriers have had to develop new technologies. See Matthew
Mickle Werdegar, Lost? The Government Knows Where You Are: Cellular
Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 103 (1998) (noting that the FCC has been repeatedly asked by
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thorough assessment of technology-forcing regulations for code is
needed, a few lessons can be gleaned from a brief analysis of the
examples noted above. First, in code-based regulation, it appears
that technology-forcing regulation is often favored over marketbased incentives.
Government prefers to simply require
manufacturers to modify their code. Secondly, regulations focused
on preventing harm are easier to justify. Concerns about safety and
violence have led to clearer guidelines and more political support.
Technology-forcing regulations that produce less clear benefits
(which becomes more important when we consider compliance
costs), such as accessibility and digital broadcasting, are much harder
to justify. The third lesson is that compliance costs matter,
especially when firms are forced to provide a vague benefit to the
public, such as digital broadcasting. The high cost of compliance
with digital broadcasting has led many to wonder if such technologyforcing regulation was needed at all, or whether the market would
have been a better mechanism for addressing such uncertain public
benefits.94
In 1996, the government passed the CDA, making it unlawful
to transmit indecent or obscene material over the Internet to
minors.95 While this law focused on prohibition, it served a
technology-forcing purpose. The CDA encouraged the development
of technologies that limited the transmission of indecent material to
minors. The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) was
developed, as a direct result of this law, by the World Wide Web
Consortium to challenge the constitutionality of the CDA by
industry to delay implementation, although it appears that industry will be able to
comply); Peter P. Ten Eyck, Dial 911 and Report a Congressional Empty Promise:
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, 54 FED. COMM. L.J.
53 (2001) (arguing we need to tighten the existing rules for enhanced 911 to foster
the development of a seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable wireless communication
network
with
911).
For
background
on
Enhanced
911
see
http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/.
93
In 1997, Congress mandated a transition to digital television by 2006. The
technology in 1997 was in its infancy and for the most part not even commercially
available. The intent of the law was to spur the development of digital television
by not allowing broadcasters to transmit analog signals after 2006. See The
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 §§ 3003 (1997);
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COMPLETING THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL
TELEVISION (1999), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=
1544&sequence=0&from=1.
94
Alan Murray, Failed Policy on HDTV Illustrates Why Free Markets Can Be
Trusted, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A4.
95
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §223 (1997).
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showing that there were less restrictive means for controlling
indecent content on the Internet.96 Nevertheless, PICS has not solved
the problem of minors gaining access to inappropriate content. In
fact, the CDA has several glaring weaknesses. First, consider that
the CDA clearly gave up on the market. While the market was not
providing an adequate solution to the problem of the minors gaining
access to inappropriate content, there was no reason to believe that
the government could not create incentives to encourage the market
to address this problem. The second problem with the justification
for the CDA was its efficacy. The CDA didn’t acknowledge that the
technology existed to address the problem. At the time of the CDA,
there were filtering products available that ensured minors did not
access inappropriate content. It seems clear that if a certain
technology exists, the rationale for a technology-forcing regulation
should be promoting its diffusion. Clearly, the CDA was not the best
method to ensure a wide diffusion of filtering software. Instead, the
government should have considered incentives or an outright
regulation mandating filtering software. In the end, the justification
for the CDA seems to have been more about political expediency
than about addressing a societal concern. Indeed, the CDA was
largely considered to be unconstitutional, and thus ineffective, from
its very beginning.97
Another concern is whether the CDA was addressing a welldefined harm. The CDA regulated both obscene and indecent
communications, and while the harm from obscene communications
was widely recognized, the harm from indecent communications was
not agreed upon. In fact, the most vigorous debate over the CDA
concerned the banning of indecent material that, in some cases, was
useful for minors, such as sexual education material.98 Such an
example illustrates the inappropriateness of technology-forcing
regulation when government does not have a well-defined harm to
address.
The final problem with the CDA concerns compliance. It
was never clear how government would monitor and enforce the

96

Interview with James Miller, Designer for PICS, in Bloomington, Ill. (Aug. 13,
1999).
97
See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 51 (1996) (noting the constitutional problems with the CDA).
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CDA on a worldwide medium.99 While government could clearly
make an impact, it seemed reasonable that any significant impact
would require international cooperation. The CDA did not consider
this issue at all.
2. Methods of Standards Regulation
There are two general methods of regulating with standards:
using a performance standard or a design standard. Performance
standards do not specify a technology, but instead set forth
guidelines for how a technology should operate.100 This allows the
market to create and shape a product as it sees fit. This is the
principal advantage of performance standards. The flexibility of
performance standards is the reason why firms prefer to develop
technologies to meet performance standards.101 At the other
extreme, we have regulations specifying design standards. Design
standards state precisely how a technology must operate. The
advantage of a design standard for the government is enforceability.
Manufacturers have strict guidelines for building a product, and an
inspector can easily ascertain compliance. In contrast, the flexibility
of a performance standard can lead to problems with enforceability
due to the lack of specificity over the correct testing procedure to
meet a performance standard.102
A middle ground between design standards and performance
standards are the “best available technology” (BAT) regulations.
These regulations are typically focused on gradually removing a
harm based upon the available technology. Statutes are often worded
to require the use of “reasonably available control technology” or the
99
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“lowest achievable emission rate.”103 While, the main use of BAT
regulations has been to reduce pollution, they have been criticized
for not accounting for differences among users, imposing a large
burden on agencies for enforcement and information gathering, and
serving to slow technological innovation.104 The counterargument to
these criticisms is that the BAT approach provides a much simpler
regulatory process that is even-handed, easily enforced,105 and can
adapt to changing circumstances because of its reliance on what is
reasonably available rather than specifying a numerical value.
Recognizing each of their strengths and weaknesses, all three
of these approaches can be used to shape code. However, there
clearly are tradeoffs between these options. While performance
standards provide a great deal of flexibility and allow for marketbased solutions,106 design standards are fixed approaches, but allow
the government to easily ensure compliance. In the development of
digital broadcasting, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has been criticized for using design standards to protect users
from interference.107 Critics believed these regulations were too
precise and instead industry should have been granted more freedom
to deal with interference problems.108 Finally, the BAT approach
103
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encompasses standards that can change over time. An example of a
hypothetical code-based BAT standard is requiring government
agencies to use the “best available encryption technology in the
storage of medical information.” This standard would require
government agencies to update their systems as more effective
technologies are developed.
C. Using Market-Based Regulation
Critics of either standard-setting or the command and control,
top-down, approach often propose using market-based incentives as
an alternative to direct rulemaking. Market-based incentives can be
based upon a number of different economic instruments and are more
efficient than standard-setting.109 That is, the cost of regulating a
harm with market-based incentives is generally less than with
government mandated standard-setting.
In this section, we focus on the use of taxes and marketable
property rights for regulating code. While, taxes can be used to
penalize a particular conduct or technology (consider the gas-guzzler
tax on automobiles that are not fuel-efficient).110 Marketable
property rights utilize the market as an allocation mechanism to limit
conduct or a technology. This regulatory scheme, which allows
firms to buy and sell their property rights to others, has been used to
address a variety of societal concerns from congestion to pollution.
The choice between marketable property rights and taxes is
largely a choice between a price-based system and a quantity-based
system. In using taxes, the government is increasing the price of
undesirable behavior. In using marketable property rights, the
government is fixing the amount of undesirable behavior that is
acceptable to society. As a result, a tax-based system has an
uncertain impact on undesirable behavior, but the cost is known to
www.fcc.gov/Reports/ec961101.txt,http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Ord
ers/1996/fcc96493.txt (noting the design standards nature of the FCC’s
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firms. A marketable property rights scheme can have a fixed impact
on the undesirable behavior, but the cost to firms is unknown.
Therefore, a crucial decision for regulators is whether they are
concerned about setting a target for reducing the undesirable
behavior or for fixing the cost that is borne by firms.111
Two principal criticisms of market-based approaches exist.
The first is that its theoretical efficiency does not appear in the real
world. Rather, the problem of monitoring and funding such
programs leads to a higher cost for government than using standardsetting regulation. The second criticism rests on moral/ethical
grounds. In using a market-based incentive, society is saying that it
is acceptable to engage in a socially undesirable behavior. For some
critics, this is intolerable. As an extreme example, it is simply wrong
for government to use a market-based approach to regulate murder.
In this context, individuals and firms should not be allowed to
engage in murder by merely paying a “murder” tax. The following
sections address these criticisms and highlight the advantages of
these methods in shaping and regulating code.
1. Taxes
The government uses its power of taxation as a powerful tool
for shaping code. In using this power, the government can increase
an individual’s or firm’s tax burden to encourage certain behavior.
This section examines how taxes or fees can be used to penalize a
particular activity or product.112 As an example, the gas-guzzler tax
on automobiles is an alternative to regulation or classic standardsetting.113 In this section, we discuss when taxes are preferable to
using regulation in deterring socially undesirable behavior or
products.
There are two approaches to using taxes, fees and penalties.
The first approach, fees, usually consists of a monetary penalty on a
product or activity that is unrelated to the user’s income. In general,
a fee is more appropriate when users can be readily excluded from
111
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receiving the relevant service or product.114 This is the case with
alcohol, the gas-guzzler tax, and fees on the sale of tires to finance
cleanup of improper tire disposal sites.115 The second approach, tax
penalties, is analogous to tax expenditures, but serves to penalize
rather than reward.116 Throughout this section, we will use the term
taxes to refer to both fees and taxes based on the income tax.
There are several objections to using taxes as an alternative to
regulation. The first questions the efficiency of taxes because of the
difficulty of setting the right price for a tax. A tax will lead to some
taxpayers changing their behavior, but other taxpayers may not
change their behavior, and instead, just pay the tax. The critical
issue is setting the right level for the tax.117 If the tax is too high, the
government will discourage too much of the activity. If the tax is too
low, the government will not discourage enough of the activity. The
second objection also considers the efficiency of this approach, but
focuses instead on the administrative costs. When using a tax
penalty, the government must enforce, collect, and dispose the taxes.
This is a weighty burden for government. The final objection is that
the use of taxes is morally wrong in certain circumstances. Taxes
allow the disfavored behavior to continue as long as the monetary
penalties are paid. Entities that have adequate financial resources are
not then affected by the tax. Additionally, if the penalty affects the
income tax, it will not be a strong deterrent to those firms or
individuals with low tax rates. In either situation, the tax is
inadequate to prevent certain individuals and firms from performing
the socially undesirable activity.
The first issue that a regulator must address is the question of
setting the tax accurately. This issue is not formidable. Just as with
a regulation, government will have to evaluate the costs and benefits
of any action it undertakes. Based on this data, the government can
establish a tax at the right level. The advantage of using a tax over
other methods is that its initial impact upon the industry can be
accurately forecasted. Moreover, if the tax is either too high or too
low, it can be later adjusted to the socially optimal level.
114
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The second question concerns administrative costs. When
government seeks to reduce undesirable conduct, it will either use
regulation or a market-based incentive such as a tax.118 In both
cases, the government will bear the administrative costs. In the case
of regulations, the government spends its resources setting and
enforcing regulations. With taxes, the government spends its
resources collecting, enforcing, and disposing the proceeds.119 Since
government already has an established taxing system, taxes may be
preferable to regulations because of their low administrative cost (as
long as the tax can be collected with minimal non-compliance).120
The third objection to using taxes is a moral one. To address
this concern, we believe taxes should be limited to those actions that
society deems wrong but allowable. In general, taxes are best used
when individuals and firms may be allowed to continue to engage in
a socially undesirable activity at a low level. In other words, the cost
of discovering the activity is not outweighed by the detriment of the
activity. This permits a certain degree of flexibility across a
population or industry. As a result, this unevenness in the
distribution of burden for taxes limits its use to particular cases. If an
activity involves fundamental rights, such as worker safety or
discrimination, taxes are generally inappropriate and clear-cut
regulation is the preferred solution.121 This is, at least in part,
because we value equal treatment when it comes to individual
rights.122 Consequently, taxes are preferable in situations where
society is not confronting basic rights and is comfortable with an
unequal distribution of the desired activity across society.123
118
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Taxes are preferable to regulation when it is possible to
influence consumer behavior.124 In contrast to the cost of complying
with regulatory standards, the cost of paying taxes can be estimated.
These costs can then be easily communicated to the consumer in the
final cost of the product or through tax advisors. Consumers are thus
aware of both the costs as well as the governmental policy
disfavoring a specific activity or product. As a result, this influences
consumers toward products and activities that are not subject to a tax.
Indeed, firms have a continued incentive to innovate and improve
their technologies to reduce their tax burden. Similarly, taxes are
preferable to tax expenditures or direct spending because they are not
limited by budgetary constraints.125
There are two reasons why taxes are uncommon. The first is
political: no one wants to raise taxes. Instead, a regulation is
preferable. The second reason is that established firms prefer a
standard-setting regulation to a tax. This is because, from the
viewpoint of a firm, taxes cost more than regulation.126
One potential application for taxing code is the problem of
unsolicited bulk e-mail (spam). By placing a tax on each email
message, the government would provide an incentive not to send an
email message. This would also reduce email congestion. If this tax
was small, e.g., $.01/message, this would have a minimal impact
124
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upon most email users, while subjecting bulk e-mailers who may
send out millions of e-mail messages to a significant tax burden.127
The major objection to this proposal is neither the proper setting of
the tax nor the moral propriety of such a tax. Instead, the issue is
ensuring compliance. A firm or an individual can send e-mail
messages, whether bulk or not, with minimal equipment and training.
The ease of sending e-mail stems from the open philosophy designed
into e-mail technologies with its roots in academia. This has led to
proposals that the underlying structure for transmitted e-mail
messages be modified.128 Nevertheless, using current technologies,
it would be very difficult to ensure compliance with such a tax. Here,
a tax would not serve as an effective method for shaping code.
2. Marketable Property Rights
An alternative market-based regulatory mechanism is the use
of a property-based system. Fundamental to this idea is that by
creating property or a property right that can then be exchanged in
the marketplace, the regulator is depending on the superior allocative
efficiency of the market over government allocation.129 For
example, the government can either create property in a tangible or
intangible form, such as land, copyright, or even privacy.
Government can also create a property right that allows an entity to
engage in specific conduct, e.g., to pollute through sulphur dioxide
emissions. The resulting property right allows an individual to use
the property as well as to sell the property as she sees fit. In some
cases, the government may create a trading system for a property
right to ensure its efficient transfer. This allows the use of prices as a
signal and an incentive, which should theoretically lead to an
efficient distribution of the property. Moreover, by limiting and
reducing marketable property rights, the government can reduce or
eliminate the pertinent conduct. Thus, a marketable property right is
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an efficient method for the government to limit either a harm or a
technology.
The creation of marketable property rights has been used to
regulate a variety of issues from congestion to pollution.130 In the
United States, marketable property rights have been created for
eliminating lead in gasoline, reducing ozone-depleting gases in
accordance with the Montreal Protocol, reducing sulphur oxides, and
reducing pollutants in the Los Angeles area.131 In these cases, the
government created a system to trade marketable property rights. By
limiting and reducing the amount of marketable property rights, the
government can control the extent of an activity.
Several problems arise when using marketable property
rights. The first is the inefficiency due to the high administrative
costs needed in the creation and administration of marketable
property rights; government must define, allocate, sell, and monitor
the use of these property rights. These high administrative costs
suggest that marketable property rights are an inefficient solution as
compared to standards based regulation. The second problem
concerns the strategic use of marketable property rights. Since there
are no perfectly competitive markets, firms can distort the intent of
marketable property rights to their advantage. The final problem is
that the use of marketable property rights is also questioned on
ethical grounds.
Government must acknowledge that there are administrative
costs in creating and administering marketable property rights.132 It
needs to evaluate these costs in considering whether to opt for
standards based regulation or for a marketable property rights
program. The first issue that the government must struggle with is
defining the property. The metes and bounds of the property right is
not a trivial issue – it will be contested.133 Second, once a
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marketable right is established, how should the rights be allocated?
For example, should they be auctioned?134 Or should existing users
get free marketable rights through grandfathering?135
Third,
government may have to create and administer a trading system for
the property right. This is a crucial ingredient since an efficient
market depends upon low transactions costs for property transfer.136
The final issue for the government is ensuring compliance.
Government must ensure that firms have the proper property rights to
engage in the regulated conduct. Otherwise, firms will continue to
conduct the activity or use the technology without specific property
rights. In fact, low monitoring costs are essential for a marketable
property rights scheme to be successful.137
Although theoretical, a perfect market in which no actor has
market power does not actually exist.138 Hence, one expects firms to
attempt to distort the market to their advantage. Firms could use
their influence to collude to keep prices low or set pricing levels.139
Or firms could buy up the marketable property to create a barrier to
entry for new firms.140 The government must strive to achieve a
closely competitive market when establishing the marketable
property right. Otherwise, government must rely upon antitrust law
to ensure competition.141
The final issue to address is the moral argument against
marketable property rights.142 This issue is focused not on
efficiency, but on ethical concerns. When government creates a
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property right, they are tacitly approving the behavior. Moreover,
government is removing the stigma attached to the conduct by
creating property rights. This is one of the reasons why people have
been opposed to market-based approaches to minimize pollution.
This is similar to concerns about inequality in using taxes.143
Therefore, a regulator should try to avoid creating a marketable
property right when society uniformly regards an activity as morally
wrong.
An advantage to using marketable property rights is that they
are generally more efficient than standard-setting regulatory
approaches.144 In using marketable property rights, entities allocate
the marketable property rights among themselves using a pricing
mechanism. This approach is much more efficient than when the
government mandates the allocations of property rights for each
entity. It simply would be too expensive and burdensome for the
government to collect information on individual costs to make this
allocation. Moreover, the pricing mechanism provides firms with
flexibility because they can choose their own allocation of property
rights. Firms may decide to purchase additional property rights or
they may choose to earn revenue by selling their property rights.
This flexibility contrasts with the uniformity of standard-setting
measures. As a result, theoretically, the marketable property right
scheme is more efficient than standard- setting regulatory approaches.
However, in assessing whether to use marketable property rights, the
government must consider the inefficiencies that emerge in
administering property rights and the consequences of the lack of a
perfectly competitive market. Nevertheless, marketable property
rights, in some circumstances, such as those involving low
monitoring costs, can save billions of dollars compared to standardsetting regulatory approaches.145
Another advantage of marketable property rights is the
benefit created from continued technological innovation. Firms also
have an incentive to innovate because technological innovations can
allow them to sell off or use their marketable property rights more
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efficiently.146 Compare this to a standard, where once the firm meets
the set standard, they have little incentive for further innovation.
In the realm of code, the first notable creation of marketable
property rights has been for the domain name system (DNS).147 In
this case, the government supported the creation of additional
domain names for greater consumer choice, lower prices, and better
service. To administer this process, the government turned over the
management of the DNS to a private actor.148 However, the
government has maintained oversight to ensure the system is not
used strategically for the benefit of a few.149 This is necessary
considering the persistent problems with the DNS privatization
process. In fact, the government has advocated creating more
property and lowering the cost for consumers.150 The government’s
efforts to date have been focused on creating property rights for
greater consumer choice, not a regulatory mechanism. However, one
possible intervention is the government’s interest in creating new top
level domains such as .xxx, .adult, or .kids.151 This intervention is
not about limiting behavior or allocating scarce resources, but is
instead attempting to “fence off” or contain an activity to a specific
146
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piece of property (more akin to zoning of real property than as an
alternative for standard-setting regulation).
The second use of marketable property rights for code could
be in the privacy area. Scholars have argued that the creation of a
property right in privacy could correct market failures by providing
people with control over their personal information.152 The property
right would lead to firms bargaining for a person’s information,
rather than the current system in which the incentives are for firms to
disclose information without consent. However, it is not clear
whether this approach is warranted. It appears that the creation of a
privacy property right may not truly meet the needs of its proponents.
The problem for most proponents is not the quantity of privacy, i.e.,
too much or too little. Instead, the problem is the lack of negotiation
and meaningful assent between parties during a transaction.153 This
is not a problem that marketable property rights can address.
Marketable property rights work best to limit a quantity of harm and
are not helpful in facilitating informed negotiations. Additionally,
the purpose of property rights is to allow the market to allocate scare
resources, and it is not clear how the market can allocate privacy
property rights that are tied to individuals. Furthermore, it is not
clear how such a privacy property rights system will be
administered.154 Finally, there is a moral objection to allowing
people to buy and sell privacy.155 In sum, the creation of a
marketable property right in privacy is not a suitable alternative to
regulation.
D. Modifying Liability
Changes in liability doctrine are currently driving changes in
the code.156 This section examines two different ways government
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can use liability to shape code. The first is through the law of torts,
specifically product liability law. The second is through the law of
contracts. We end by discussing how the relationship between
increased liability and insurance companies can encourage the
development of third party regulators, such as the Underwriters
Laboratories, to shape code to address societal concerns.
1. Product Liability Law
Product liability law is governed by tort law and can affect
the development of code.157 It depends not upon government
agencies, but on persons who have been physically harmed and are
seeking compensation in the courts.158 One function of product
liability law is to encourage firms to improve the safety of their
products.159 This section discusses how products liability law can
serve as an alternative form of regulation to encourage the
development of safer code.160
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Product liability law is a controversial area of the law.161 Its
impact has varied considerably by industry.162 As of yet, product
liability law has not had a substantial impact on code.163 This is not
surprising considering that most losses from code are merely
economic with no accompanying physical injury.164 Nevertheless, it
is entirely foreseeable that as the use of code grows, it may
increasingly be involved in physical injuries. As a result, product
liability will grow in importance and will begin to shape code.165
However, the broadening of product liability to code may not
become fully obvious because code is often contained within the
systems of larger products that have traditionally been subject to
product liability, such as automobiles or medical devices.166
One prominent example of product liability law shaping a
technology is Larsen v. General Motors Corp.167 General Motors
argued that it had no duty to design an automobile that protects
occupants in the event of a crash. Crashing an automobile was
outside its intended use. However, the court disagreed. It held that
the manufacturer of a vehicle has a duty to design one with
reasonable care. This meant protecting occupants of the automobile
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in the event of a crash, even though crashing is not the intended
use.168
There are several objections to using products liability law to
shape technologies. First, critics argue that product liability law is
inefficient. They suggest that a more efficient method would be to
allow consumers to select technologies based on their own
evaluation of risk and safety concerns. As the argument goes, this
would encourage the market to develop a wide range of technologies
that are responsive to consumer needs. This would also save firms
substantial litigation costs.169
Second, critics argue that the
unpredictability of products liability law can lead to uneven results,
since firms have difficulty predicting their liability exposure.170 The
third objection is that product liability law has a chilling effect upon
innovation. In essence, the potential of product liability reduces
innovation and keeps beneficial products off the market.171
While the market is theoretically more efficient, many of its
assumptions are violated in the real world. Product liability law can
be more efficient than other alternatives, which are subject to market
defects and transaction costs. These defects can include buyers who
are unaware of the risks or accorded inadequate opportunities to
bargain for a safer and more expensive product.172 In the case of a
complex product, where a buyer could not ascertain the risks
adequately, scholars have argued that it may be best to place liability
on the manufacturer because it could best weigh the associated
costs.173 The threat of liability causes manufacturers to internalize
social costs into their products, thereby increasing costs for the
manufacturer.174 However, these costs produce safer products.
Whether the costs of liability law are outweighed by its benefits is
difficult to ascertain, because the deterrence aspect of product
liability law provides a benefit to society that cannot be easily
168
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measured.175 It is also difficult to account for what society gains
from firms not releasing unsafe products. There is considerable
evidence that product liability laws have led to safer products. For
example, the change from a negligence standard to a strict liability
standard has resulted in far fewer deadly accidents.176 Some even
argue that if product liability laws were more stringent, we would
have even safer products.177
Product liability law is typically unpredictable through its use
of punitive damages, which often vary because they punish
defendants for their conduct.178 In fact, in product liability cases in
state and federal courts between 1965 and 1990, punitive damages
were only awarded 355 times over the entire twenty-five year
period!179 The purpose of punitive damages is twofold. First,
punitive damages express to defendants that their conduct is
intolerable.180 Secondly, punitive damages serve as a deterrent
because they reward plaintiffs subject to serious misconduct above
their actual damages.181 As a result, punitive damages provide firms
with a strong incentive to ensure their products meet society’s
minimal standards for safety. As a deterrent, there is evidence that
punitive damages can result in safer products.182 Third, there is not a
simple direct relationship between increased liability and decreased
innovation.183 At high levels of liability, there is lower research and
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development activity, and thus, less innovation.184 A degree of
product liability risk creates an incentive to develop safer products,
but at extremely high-risk levels, there is a reduction in the
development of new products. This leads to the conclusion that there
is a balancing point between increasing safety and slowing of
technological progress.185 Thus, a certain degree of liability can
actually increase innovation.
Other research has found that
innovation and safety can’t be separated; liability affects both. In
fact, liability promotes safety and innovation of desirable products,
while also discouraging the development of unsafe products that may
be innovative.186
One distinct advantage of product liability law is its public
visibility.187 The publicity of a product liability lawsuit can serve to
stimulate safety through a variety of societal institutions.188
Naturally, a products liability lawsuit will lead manufacturers to
reexamine their practices. Moreover, the publicity can also spurn
regulatory agencies to action as well as leading to consumer demand
for safety.189 Moreover, there is also evidence that product liability
lawsuits provide firms with an incentive for developing safer
products by affecting their wealth through the stock market.190
Product liability already plays a role in shaping the
development of code. In industries where defective code can cause
physical injury, e.g., aerospace and medicine, developers strive to
make safer code. There are many reasons, besides purely regulatory
concerns, why firms avoid developing unsafe code. These include a
loss of revenue and reputation, as well as product liability costs. As
a result, firms developing code for aerospace applications and
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medical devices use a number of developmental strategies to ensure
high quality code.191
Product liability can also play a role in shaping the future
development of code. One such potential application is to hold firms
liable for failing to properly secure their computer systems.192 Firms
that do not implement appropriate levels of security not only place
themselves at risk, but may also serve as unwitting pawns in attacks
on other computer systems. Analysts have argued that one solution
to this problem is the imposition of tort liability.193 Such liability
would motivate firms into adopting more secure code and better
security procedures.
2. Contract Law
A second option for regulating with liability is by using
contract law. Typically a transaction involving code falls under the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which has been virtually fully
enacted by all fifty states.194 The UCC contains default rules for
contracts, rules that govern all contracts, and default rules regarding
warranties.195
Recently, there has been a movement to amend the UCC to
better handle transactions with intellectual property and software.
This was initially titled Article 2B. However, sharp differences of
opinion emerged from the drafting process.
Eventually, the
American Law Institute withdrew from the process and eliminated
Article 2B as an amendment to the UCC. However, supporters of
Article 2B renamed the legislation the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA).196 UCITA has since been
191
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enacted in Virginia and Maryland and is being considered by other
states.
UCITA is a contemporary example of how changes in
liability affect code. The pro-UCITA movement is being led by the
software industry vendors and has led to two states adopting UCITA.
However, a number of organizations have been fighting the adoption
of UCITA. This has led a few states to pass anti-UCITA legislation,
bomb-shelter legislation, which protects their residents against
licensing provisions in contracts governed by UCITA.197 Without
addressing the merits of UCITA, we will highlight some provisions
of UCITA and changes in contractual liability that could affect the
development of code.
UCITA allows developers to insulate themselves from
liability for damages caused by software.198 According to Barbara
Simons, “we know that it is almost impossible to write bug-free
software, [b]ut UCITA will remove any legal incentives to develop
trustworthy software, because there need be no liability.”199 As a
result, many software industry insiders believe that UCITA will only
lead to even lower quality standards for code.
A second criticism of UCITA is that it would create
enforceable provisions against reverse engineering, the process of
analyzing code to determine how it operates. Reverse engineering is
an accepted practice under copyright and trade secret law, and is
usually for the purpose of duplication by competitors who wish to
develop rival code. 200 However, UCITA allows firms to prohibit
reverse engineering of products. Undoubtedly, this provision will
197
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make it more difficult to develop competing products. While it may
be difficult to enforce, this provision will still have an unsettling
effect upon code development.201
A third criticism of UCITA is that it allows developers to
enforce contractual provisions against public criticisms of software,
potentially affecting the writing of reviews, comparisons, and
benchmark tests on code. These writings serve to inform consumers
and create a more competitive marketplace.202 While this provision
may be found to be unenforceable on public policy grounds, it will
still have a chilling effect upon the reviews of code.203
UCITA is an example of how changes in liability can shape
code. Although, it is highly questionable whether UCITA in its
present form will be widely adopted, the fundamental concepts
behind the creation of UCITA are very relevant. In essence, UCITA
is a balancing of various liabilities and conditions for the use of code
between developers and consumers. Whatever the outcome is, it will
serve to shape the code developed in a post-UCITA world.
2. Insurance and Third Party Regulators
One consequence of liability is the development of
institutions to lessen and spread the risk of liability. Insurance has
long been a mechanism to spread the risk of liability from events
such as fire or earthquakes.204 Of even greater interest is how
liability and insurance companies can foster the development of third
party institutions to regulate products. The archetype of this concept
is the Underwriters Laboratories (UL), which conducts uniform
testing of electrical appliances to assess their safety. A similar, codebased laboratory could be established to ensure that code meets
various societal concerns.
In order to foster similar results, it is necessary to consider
the factors that led to the growth of the Underwriters Laboratories
(UL). UL’s history began with a rash of electrical fires in major
201
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American cities in the 1890s.205 This led a number of insurance
companies, such as the Chicago Board of Fire Underwriters, Western
Insurance Association, and the Electrical Bureau of the National
Board of Fire Underwriters, to fund a testing laboratory.206 The
laboratory became the UL and provided rigorous, unbiased, testing
of electrical devices for fire prevention.207 Today, the UL works
with over sixty thousand manufacturers with its label present on over
one hundred thousand products, each evaluated for safety.208 The
success of the UL is the result of a close relationship with insurance
companies and government regulators. This relationship ensures
manufacturers follow UL’s safety standards. As a result, consumers
and manufacturers consider products bearing the UL label to be safe.
As a result of recent concerns about security, the government
is attempting to foster a similar system for code.209 Such a system
begins with companies purchasing insurance for cyber security.
Insurance companies provide discounts to firms with better security
practices and those who use more reliable security products. This
would encourage the creation of an analogous UL for testing code.
Ideally, this laboratory could work as efficiently as the UL and be
able to test the vast amounts of code-based products in a timely
manner. Companies using these approved pieces of code would have
their premiums reduced thereby increasing demand for more secure
code and creating an incentive for developers to make sure their
products met the standards of the code-based UL.
The aforementioned approach is very compelling. It is
largely based on private actors with government merely promoting
and using the tested products. The incentive structure for insurance
companies, the insured, and developers appears to be very clear.
While this scheme has proved successful for the UL and electrical
products, there are significant issues with using insurance and third
party regulators for code. Consequently, our approach also addresses
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how to regulate code consisting of a large number of products that
change rapidly.
We believe that there are three issues the government must
consider in trying to encourage the development of an insurance
system for code. First, insurance is not appropriate for potential
losses where self-protection measures play an important role.
Insurance works best in situations when its price is largely
independent of expenditures on self-protection.210 For example,
homeowners demand insurance against fire and earthquakes because
these are events that are largely independent of self-protection
measures. Conversely, when the price of market insurance depends
upon self-protection, there will be a small demand for market
insurance and a large demand for self-protection measures.211
The importance of self-protection for Internet security lessens
the need for insurance. In the current state of the Internet, selfprotection measures play an important role in reducing losses. This
is evident in the vast industry devoted to developing and teaching
self-protection skills to firms.212 As a result of the importance of
self-protection, the natural inclinations of the market will not foster
the development of market insurance for security.
Thus,
government’s encouragement will not be enough to foster the
development of an insurance system.
Without a viable insurance system, there is little incentive for
insurance companies to encourage third party regulators for code.
Moreover creating third party regulators, which are not backed by
insurance companies or some other entity that can force compliance,
is bound to fail.213 Absent the support of insurance companies and
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the subsequent threat of financial repercussions, there is little
incentive for the growth of vigorous third party regulators for
code.214
Another problem with insurance for code is the need for
determinable damages. If losses cannot be estimated by insurance
companies, they cannot provide market insurance that is priced in
accordance with the risk.215 The problem is that code-based damages
are different than a loss from a fire or hazard, because damage from a
fire is tangible, obvious, and irreplaceable. Code in the form of
software, in databases, and other similar media is often intangible.
Moreover, it is not obvious what the losses actually are when many
code-based losses are reversible.216 Examples of these are computer
viruses, hacker attacks, and the defacement of web pages. The
remedy for many code-based security losses is that members of a
firm’s staff must perform activities such as removing viruses from
computers and restoring backups.
Therefore, predicting and
assessing a firm’s damages is difficult. Moreover, it may be that
damages are so low that firms prefer to self-insure.
Yet another problem concerns the appropriate purchaser of
insurance. Throughout the government’s efforts to improve security,
it has focused on insurance for firms who use the Internet in their
daily business. If its goal is developing more secure products, the
government should focus on insurance for code developers, thereby
addressing the problems of self-protection and determination of
damages. If these firms were subject to liability, then they and their
insurers would have a tremendous incentive to address that liability,
which could lead to several outcomes.217
The developers could
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adopt voluntary “best practices” industry standards for security.218
Their insurers could then require them to adopt these new practices.
Insurers could also encourage the development of a third party
regulator to test products to ensure they are secure. Finally, the
industry could seek government regulation of code as a way to limit
their liability. All of these are ways that product liability and
insurance can proactively shape code.
E. Requiring Disclosure
The government can shape the development of code by
requiring disclosure, thereby requiring firms to provide information
about their products. This differs from educational campaigns
funded by the government, which we discuss later.219 Disclosure is
intended to inform consumers, which then allows markets to work
more efficiently.220 In many cases, the technical sophistication of
code leads to few people understanding it. As an example, most
users didn’t understand the privacy risks of cookies until the media
reported them. Cookies are a technology that web sites can use to
maintain information on their visitors. Many people still don’t really
understand how cookies operate and their privacy implications.221
As a result of their limited knowledge, many people are not able to
protect their privacy, and consequently, their personal information is
being collected.222 These privacy problems may be substantially
reduced if firms are required to meaningfully disclose the privacy
risks of cookies.
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According to Justice Breyer, disclosure works most
effectively when the following three conditions are met.223 First, the
public has to be able to understand the information disclosed.
Regulations are of no use if the information provided is too complex.
Second, the public must have a choice within the market. Disclosure
is of no use if the public can’t select a different alternative. Third,
the public must find the information materially relevant. If the
public finds no value in the disclosure, there is little utility in
requiring such disclosure. Based on this analysis, we offer several
potential approaches for government to regulate code with
disclosure. These include the use of disclosure to set product
standards, disclosure for certain products or activities, and industrywide disclosure.
To provide the public with better information, the
government can require firms to label their products with product
standards.224 For such a label to be successful, it must be able to
convey information in a meaningful and concise manner. An
example of a labeling standard is the United States Department of
Agriculture’s standards for food quality.225 Another problem,
unsolicited bulk email (spam), led the government to require the
origin and the subject line of commercial email messages to not be
deceptive.226 This disclosure ensures people are better informed
about the source and content of commercial email messages.
Government can also mandate disclosure to ensure
consumers are adequately informed. This is a step beyond labeling
and includes measures such as requiring firms to affirmatively
provide information.
Indeed, the Securities and Exchange
Commission requires public companies to disclose meaningful
information, including financial information, to the public. This
inspired a California law, which required public disclosure of any
computer security breaches in which the confidential information of
a California resident may have been accessed.227 Another example
of a code-based disclosure policy is the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act. This law requires web sites to report what children’s
223
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information it collects, uses, and discloses, thus allowing parents to
make an informed decision about what web sites their child should
visit.228
A final method of disclosure is encouraging communication
within an industry or to the government. In some circumstances, the
public can benefit when firms share information. It is also in the
interest of government to support such collaboration. For instance,
the government-supported CERT Coordination Center collaborates
with industry to disclose all known security incidents.229 This
communication benefits the public by allowing the developers of
code to react quickly to potential security problems.230 However,
there is a concern that this creates room for some firms to behave
opportunistically. Firms could also use these disclosure regulations
to favor certain firms over others. This places a burden on the
government to ensure that these regulations are not used to create an
uneven competitive playing field. Other firms may even be
deliberately left out of the communication loop. The government
can also encourage firms to disclose information. In such an
instance, proposed legislation would provide firms additional
protection from disclosure of computer attacks to government law
enforcement agencies.231 Although there is a concern that this
protection is too broad and could lead to less public information on
the behavior of firms, it would provide an incentive for firms to
provide information to the government.
F. Need for a Comprehensive Regulatory Strategy
A coherent and comprehensive regulation strategy for code
has been inadequately considered by policymakers. The regulation
of code is spread over a variety of agencies including the FAA, FCC,
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FDA, FTC, and NHTSA.232 There are no guiding principles or
rationales for this regulatory approach. In contrast, the regulations
for other areas, including automobile technology and biotechnology,
have distinct rationales that guide the development of regulation.
Before the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
required the government to develop safety standards for automobiles,
auto safety had been largely unregulated.233 Today, one agency, the
NHTSA, is responsible for setting the safety standards that
automobile manufacturers must meet. In contrast, the regulation of
biotechnology is not done by one federal agency, but instead relies
upon a coordinated framework of federal agencies. This approach
was recommended in a report by the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP).234 The OSTP found that the current
laws in this area were largely adequate. This led to two guidelines
for the regulatory activity. First, each agency would operate in an
integrated and coordinated fashion with other agencies. Second, the
responsibility for a product’s use would lie with a single agency. As
a result, the USDA, EPA, and FDA are each responsible for different
phases in the development of biotechnology products ranging from
research in laboratories to products in the marketplace.235
We believe that the approach used in the regulation of
biotechnology is appropriate for code, which also has many different
uses and is created by a wide variety of parties. This diversity would
232
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cause enormous difficulties for one agency attempting to regulate all
forms of code. Instead, regulatory authority should be given based
on product use to a single agency.236 We see a movement in this
direction with recent concerns over security and the government's
efforts in attempting to unify coordination of code-based security.237
Nevertheless, we believe government needs to expend more
resources in developing a coordinated strategy for the regulation of
code.238
III. SHAPING CODE THROUGH GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Government can encourage the development and use of
socially beneficial code with its fiscal power as it does in supporting
medical research, subsidizing agriculture, and building the interstate
highway infrastructure. This section discusses four different ways
(summarized in Table 2) that government’s spending can influence
the development of code.
Method

One word
summation
R&D

Rationale

Examples

Funding the creation
of new technologies

National Science
Foundation Grants
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology efforts

Procurement
power

Buying

Purchasing certain
types
of technologies for
government use

Tax
expenditures

Deductions

Favoring certain
technologies
through reduction of
taxes

Section 508
(accessibility)
requirements
Energy star
requirements
Electric car tax
deduction

Supporting
research and
development
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Method
Education
and training

One word
summation
Education

Rationale

Examples

Informing and
promoting socially
responsible behavior

Campaigns to
educate people
about
firewalls and
computer security

Table 2. Fiscal methods for encouraging the development of code
A. Government Support of Research and Development
The government can support and shape the development of
code by funding research and development activities intended to
develop code.239 Society’s research and development spending on
computers and electronics alone totaled thirty six billion dollars in
2000.240 While the majority of this funding is from industry for
industry, the federal government accounts for about six billion
dollars spent on research and development for computers and
electronics.241 In spending money on research and development, the
federal government can use two distinct approaches. We suggest
that while government support of basic, knowledge-seeking research
is essential for long-term innovation, we also believe that missionoriented funding can address and shape code that meets societal
concerns.
In discussing government support of research and
development, we wish to avoid the common distinction between
basic and applied research. Instead, we believe a better distinction is
to view research as being basic, knowledge-seeking, or more
mission-oriented.242 Thus, in discussing the funding of basic and
mission-oriented research, we focus on the motivations of the
research and not on the methods or outcomes.243 Accordingly, we
239
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240
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will use the terms basic research and mission-oriented research in our
discussion.
1. Funding Basic Research
Basic research strives to understand how things work without
having specific applications in mind. This type of research has
resulted in great innovations, including government funded basic
research leading to the development of the Internet and the World
Wide Web. The rationale for such government funding is that the
private sector will not perform an adequate amount of basic research.
This market failure exists for a number of reasons. First, firms
cannot predict the future economic value of basic research.244 The
core characteristic of basic research is that it is unknown what
application it may serve. Secondly, once the knowledge is produced,
it is difficult to keep the knowledge from others.245 The benefits of
funding research and development cannot be entirely captured by a
firm. Consequently, this leads rational-acting firms to concentrate

Science is produced by basic research, while technology comes from applied
research. Moreover, implicit in this distinction is a linear model of development.
This holds that basic research leads to applied research and that advances in
science lead to advances in technology. We believe these divisions between what
is being studied, the methods, outcome, and resulting linear model are an
anachronism and lead to a poor understanding of technological development.
Relying on this conception of technological development does not allow us to
understand the development of code, especially in relation to government support
of code. This is why more recent material ignores these divisions. Id. at 120. See
also COMMITTEE ON CRITERIA FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT ON RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, ALLOCATING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(1995),
available
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See also COMPUTER SCIENCE AND
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REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR COMPUTING RESEARCH (1999).
(providing the economic rationale for government supported research and
development).
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their resources on applied problems whose benefits are better
captured by the firm.246
The problem of under-funding by the private sector led to
calls for government funding. The most celebrated and influential
supporter of government funding was Vannevar Bush, who argued
that researchers should be allowed to perform research without
concerns about its practicality.247 He believed that curiosity-driven
research eventually leads to technological innovation. Therefore, if
government wants to increase technological innovation, it should
fund more basic research.248 This argument has been very persuasive
and has resulted in substantial government funding for basic research
and development. In the field of computer science, the government
spent almost $900 million on academic research in 1999.249
Historically, this emphasis on basic research has led to the
development of many technological innovations of code. Besides the
development of the web, government’s support has been
instrumental for a number of other important computer innovations
such as timesharing, computer networking, workstations, computer
graphics, the mouse, the windows interface, VLSI circuit design,
RISC computing, parallel computing, and digital libraries.250 We
have no doubt that additional basic research will lead to further
innovations in the future, and this is why we support government
funding of basic research.
A few critics argue that government funding of basic research
is not needed. For them, government funding is simply wasteful and
unneeded.251 This position has been harshly criticized.252 For
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example, Nelson found in a variety of industries that government
support of research and development was valuable; even in industries
with a high level of private research and development, there was a
substantial role for government supported research and
development.253
The criticisms of government funding are largely about what
research to conduct. In basic research, scientists, not society, decide
what is important. Yet, this research is funded by society who, quite
rightly, wants to ensure that there are tangible, societal and economic
benefits flowing from this research. Moreover, society believes
certain areas of research demand higher priority. Recently, this has
been manifested in a rapid increase for basic research in medicine,
which has led to reduced funding in other areas such as energy and
astronomy.254 Since the basic research model cannot address
immediate societal problems, another model for funding research and
development merits consideration.
2. Supporting Mission-Oriented Funding
The mission-oriented approach seeks to force the
development of scientific knowledge and technologies through
increased funding on specific subjects.255 This approach recognizes
the need for basic research, but suggests that we must also prioritize
and allocate resources based on societal concerns.
Though
unconcerned with learning about the world merely for the sake of
learning, this approach is concerned with problems that affect
252
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society. We believe that the mission-oriented approach permits
society to shape code to address specific societal concerns, such as
privacy and security.
While we support the use of mission-oriented funding, we
also recognize that without funding for basic research, this approach
may lead to long-term problems.
History has shown that
advancement in any field depends upon advances in other, seemingly
irrelevant, fields. For example, recent successes in medicine can be
attributed to advances in high-energy physics, computing, and
mathematics.256 Another caveat from our case studies, as well as the
literature on innovation, shows that technological innovation is often
unpredictable.257 As a result, the government may squander
resources by paying too much for a solution or failing to develop a
solution in its search for a technological solution.
There are two different mission-oriented approaches that the
government can use to shape code. The first approach is when the
government is the predominant purchaser of a product, such as
defense. In this case, the government has a legitimate interest in
shaping the technology.258 The government’s procurement interest
allows it to define its technological needs based on its own
expertise.259 Government funding for research and development
allows government to meet its needs, because firms would not
develop products because of the lack of a private market and the
uncertainty of government procurement. Although the mechanics of
the actual funding may be a procurement contract, in essence, this
approach is focused on increasing the supply of technologies with the
government funding the research and development of these
technologies.260 Critics argue that this approach is too expensive and
wasteful. In fact, there is ample evidence that some technology
decisions made by the Department of Defense have been costly and
wasteful.261 Such waste usually occurs because of both the politics
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and the sheer size of defense spending.262 However, this funding can
affect society broadly through spillover effects, which occur when
the private sector finds a commercial application for a government
supported technology.263 These spillover effects mitigate the
inherent inefficiencies in government funding of research and
development for products that it will later purchase.264
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
is an example of an agency that funds mission-oriented research and
basic research for the Department of Defense. Its achievements
include the F-117 stealth fighter, the Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System, and precision guided munitions, all of which
were used in Operation Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War of
1990.265 DARPA’s achievements have spilled over beyond the
military. For example, DARPA’s funding of ARPANET, the
precursor to the Internet, as well as the seed funding for the W3C are
prominent examples of technology spillovers from defense to
society.266
The second form of useful mission-oriented funding is
pursued by government agencies with an agenda. By an agenda we
mean an agency is supporting research and development that
advances its own well-defined purposes.267 It can then evaluate and
selectively fund projects that further those interests. This is an
effective way of supporting research that directly addresses societal
concerns. A good example of such a government agency is the
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National Institute of Health, which supports research addressing
specific diseases. The criticism of this approach is the government’s
“picking” of winners. Critics argue that there is a market for this
research, and therefore, government funding is unnecessary.
Additionally, they insist that government funding essentially
subsidizes a narrow class of winning firms that gain government
support.268
We readily agree that government generally is no match for
the market in picking winners. However, we believe that in certain
instances, government can positively shape the development of
technologies. Our support is limited to areas where there are
government agencies with defined missions. This ensures that there
are solid criteria and goals for the funding decisions as well as public
support and accountability. Moreover, an agency with a strong
mission is likely to have the expertise available to make such funding
decisions. Expertise, along with a funding policy that is based upon
evaluation of competitive proposals by informed agency officials
and/or peer review, should aid in preventing wasteful
expenditures.269
Government itself could fund projects to advance the
development of code to address societal concerns. For example,
security has now become a major concern for code. It is well known
that there are fundamental problems with key components of the
Internet’s infrastructure.270 The federal government is expected to
268
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drastically increase its spending on computer security to more than
four billion dollars a year.271 This involves supporting further
government research and development with federal agencies such as
the NSF and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) that will trickle down to universities.272 However, there is
not one government agency solely overseeing or coordinating code
development. Based on our analysis, we would recommend funding
for an existing agency in which security issues related to code are
part of its mission.273 Otherwise, it is unlikely to have the expertise
to fund projects judiciously.274
Government funding should also consider its role in creating
and participating in the development of standards because they are
considered impure public goods and will be under-produced.275
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There are several different kinds of standards that the government
can develop, including those promoting interconnection and
interoperability as well as standards that benefit public health and
safety.276 This includes work on the “Common Criteria”, a set of
mandatory security standards for code used in national security
systems.277 Funding this type of research is another way government
can shape to code to meet societal concerns.
B. Procuring Code
The government can use its power of procurement to develop
or support particular code.278 Government’s procurement power can
create or increase the market for a particular product. This “power of
the purse” focuses on the demand side of technology, in contrast to
the supply-side policies discussed previously. There is a long history
of the use of procurement power from standardized clothing sizes
during the Civil War to the U.S. Army’s giving credibility to generic
drugs.279 This power follows from the immense amount of
government expenditures.280
Cargill, supra note 100 (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, GLOBAL STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 14 n.23
(1992)).
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This section suggests that the government’s procurement
power can also be effective in shaping information technologies.281
As the largest single purchaser of code, the government will spend
over fifty billion dollars on information technologies in 2003,282
including almost nine billion dollars spent by state and federal
governments on prepackaged software in 2001.283 This makes up a
small, but significant, part of the $800 billion market for information
technologies in the United States in 2001.284 Such a large purchasing
power can be used to influence the development of code by the
private sector.285
The reasoning behind using government procurement to
shape code is that new products take time to develop as innovators
create and expand a market. This process is risky and is usually
characterized by slow growth. But when government uses its
FISCAL YEAR 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ (last
visited Jun. 5, 2003). Of this, more than $200 billion will be spent directly on
procuring goods and services. This amount involves goods and services and not
civil service or military personnel salaries, grants, foreign aid, etc. See Federal
Procurement Data System (FPDS), Federal Procurement Report, at
http://www.fpdc.gov/fpdc/FPR2000a.pdf (last visited June 5, 2002). See also
Schooner, supra note 278, n.7 at 631 (noting the limitations of this procurement
data).
281
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/final53.xls (April 9, 2001) (providing
2002 figures).
283
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Tables 1, 11, available at http://www.bea.doc.
gov/bea/papers/tables.pdf (May 3, 2002), cited in David S. Evans & Bernard
Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software: A Solution
in Search of a Problem, n. 51, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=313202
(May 21, 2002). The total sales of prepackaged software was seventy four billion
dollars.
284
WORLD INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY SERVICES ALLIANCE, DIGITAL
PLANET 2002: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY (2002).
285
Recently, the Consumer Project on Technology called for the government to
consider competition and security in its procurement decisions for code. Ralph
Nader and James Love, Consumer Project on Technology, Procurement Policy and
Competition Security in Software Markets, June 4, 2002, available at
http://www.cptech.org/at/ms/omb4jun02ms.html.

63

purchasing power, it creates a much larger market. This grants
producers economies of scale, lower unit costs, and lower risks,
thereby leading to the incorporation of new technologies and lower
prices for the public in a shorter time.286
There are two major rationales for government’s use of its
procurement power to favor certain products. The first is an
efficiency rationale that government should spend its resources
wisely. This leads to a number of potential measures that the
government can take, including buying goods in volume to save
money.287 For instance, there are efforts to procure inexpensive
products, such as generic medicines.288 Another measure could
require government purchasers to consider the total cost of
ownership instead of just the initial cost. This second rationale takes
into account the effect of externalities, which are costs or benefits not
contained in the price of a product. Government procurement has
historically internalized environmental and other social
externalities.289 This has meant that government affirmatively acted
to ensure these externalities were accounted for in the purchase of
products. If government did not account for these externalities it was
essentially saying externalities were not important by setting their
price to zero.290 Hence, by accounting for externalities, the
government strives to “set an example to the private sector, advance .
. . [specific societal] goals, and best serve the public interest.”291
There are three major criticisms with using government
procurement to shape technologies. The first is that it consists of an
unnecessary meddling with the market. Government should act as a
passive consumer and not attempt to influence the actions of private
industry. The second criticism is that government “meddling” will
286
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be useless or may even partially backfire.292 Critics argue that
government support of a particular technology may not have much
influence on the development of a technology and can even retard
use by the private sector. The final objection is that the addition of
such criteria leads to a more complicated procurement process, and
therefore, raises administrative costs.
The government has a long and successful history of activism
in shaping technologies that have no market, e.g., high technology
weapons. Similarly, it can influence the development of commercial,
off-the-shelf products.293 The rationale here is that government must
buy something, so why not buy products that offset certain
externalities. In doing so, government could set an example for
private industry by purchasing certain products or technologies that it
deems worthy. While the government has used procurement policies
for energy-efficient products since 1976,294 recently, the government
has been active with environmentally friendly procurement
measures, such as preferences for recycled products.295 Instead of
focusing on whether the government should be an active consumer,
we think critics should instead focus on whether this approach has
been successful.
We do, however, agree that government
procurement efforts can have a negligible impact on the market. To
address this concern, we suggest that government procurement
efforts be focused. Typically, this involves using government
292
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procurement to provide the early demand for a product using new
technologies.296 It is at this crucial stage that government can most
effectively shape the development of technologies for commercial
use.297
Even in markets where government demand is influential,
procurement efforts may fail.298 Consider the scenario of two goods
that are substitutes, green and brown. Government procurement of
green goods would crowd out the availability of green goods to
private industry. This would lead to private industry procuring more
brown goods as a substitute for green goods. Thus, the net effect of
the government’s and private industry’s actions would be
offsetting.299 Moreover, this could be seen as negatively impacting
the development of new products or technologies because
government would be crowding out private purchasers of green
goods. However, this analysis is based on the assumption that the
products are close substitutes. Moreover, if marginal costs are
decreasing, government intervention can lower the price for green
goods for all consumers through economies of scale. This analysis
indicates that economies of scale are an important element in the
success of government procurement for shaping technologies.300
Finally, we understand the criticisms that additional
procurement policies would raise the cost of procurement and deter
agencies from following these rules. While procurement guidelines
require agencies to purchase equipment that meets the EPA’s Energy
296
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contractors have successfully fought off requirements that would hold construction
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Star requirements,301 agencies are also supposed to purchase
products that rank in the top twenty-five percent for efficiency for
product groups without Energy Star labels.302 One report suggests
that there is a low level of compliance with these rules for a number
of reasons including a lack of enforcement, no requirement to justify
inefficient purchases, and agencies already having too many
procurement requirements to consider.303 However, there is no
compelling reason to believe that these issues could not be
addressed, if needed.304
One example of the influence of procurement power is the
government’s support of energy efficient computer equipment. An
Executive Order in 1993 mandated that computers purchased by
federal agencies must meet the EPA’s Energy Star requirements.305
In 1999, it was estimated that the Energy Star requirements on
computers and monitors saved over one billion dollars.306 Moreover,
the entire Energy Star program for labeling consumer products has
prevented emissions of 5.7 million metric tons of carbon equivalent
and saved over two billion dollars on energy bills in 1999 alone.307
These savings are the result of a voluntary government standard
supported by a procurement policy. Furthermore, these results
suggest that the EPA’s Energy Star labeling and the federal
procurement guidelines have led the private sector to purchase
energy efficient equipment. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
purchase of energy efficient products by the government has led
private industry to shift consumption toward inefficient products.
Another contemporary example of the government’s
procurement power is the requirement that the government comply
with section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Act states that any
federal purchases of computers, software, and electronic equipment
301
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used to disseminate information, including telephones, copiers, and
facsimile machines, must be accessible to persons with disabilities.308
This has prompted firms such as Microsoft, Macromedia, and Adobe
to modify their products to ensure they are capable of producing
accessible web sites and content.309 The above examples illustrate
that the government values societal concerns such as reducing carbon
emissions and ensuring that disabled people have access to
information technologies. In both of these examples, critics ask:
what is the cost of administering these programs? Moreover, what
are the additional procurement costs to the government as a result of
these requirements? This is a much harder question. First, there is
no clear data on how much extra, if any, the government has spent.
Unless this data showed that the government spent significantly more
money, it would seem irrelevant. This is because the government’s
procurement decision takes into account various externalities and
necessarily implies the government’s willingness to pay more. The
hope here is that government efforts will prompt others to also take
into account these values, and perhaps make it economically
attractive for them to do so.
The
aforementioned
analysis
suggests
several
recommendations for government procurement decisions regarding
code. The efficiency rationale suggests that government should
consider how to save money in making procurement decisions. In
keeping with this idea, the U.S. General Services Administration
(GSA) already buys information technology products in volume.
This approach is a reasonable way to save government resources.
The efficiency rationale also suggests the government should
consider standards for product quality as well as open standards that
promote interoperability. Both of these types of standards have the
potential to reduce costs. For example, recently the United Kingdom
put forth a policy seeking to use open standards that promote
interoperability while avoiding products that lock-in to proprietary
code.310
To conclude, the efficiency rationale suggests that
government should consider the total cost of ownership and not just
308
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the initial purchase price when buying products. This rationale could
lead government to support open source code if there was evidence
that its total cost of ownership was less than proprietary code.
However, there is a need for more data on the costs of open source
code as compared with proprietary code before government can
justify its use of open source code on efficiency grounds.
In procuring custom-made code, not available off-the-shelf,
the government should consider placing its source code in the public
domain.311 While this is not current practice, there is no reason why
the government cannot bargain for the source code in its contracts.312
Once government has access to the source code, duplication for the
public costs nothing because the software component of source code
is nonrivalrous.313 If the government built a building, it could not
simultaneously keep its offices there while allowing the public to use
this building. However, software code is different, since it can be
easily reproduced.314
The government may go farther by placing its source code in
the public domain, thereby keeping parties with access to the source
code from having to “reinvent the wheel.” Critics would argue that
this approach is wrong for two reasons. First, access to the source
code could allow hackers to gain control of vital systems. We agree
with this criticism and believe that the source code should not be
placed into the public domain, if there are national security concerns;
311
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e.g., it may not be appropriate for code governing military satellite
communications to be accessible by anyone. Nevertheless, there
may be portions of the code that could be placed into the public
domain for society’s benefit. Secondly, critics argue that placing
code into the public domain will result in the code just languishing
there. Instead, what is needed for further development is the ability
for a party to have exclusive property rights. While this may be true
in some instances, we do not think this is true in very many cases.
Rather, in the later section on the transfer of intellectual property
rights to the private sector, we argue that property rights are not
necessarily required for further improvement of code.315
Government procurement decisions regarding code could also
consider certain externalities such as the support of innovation,
protection of privacy, and ensuring security. The government could
use its procurement decisions to favor certain products. In the case
of innovation, the government can ensure that the products it buys
support open standards and modularity, keys to code innovation. In
the case of security, the government could ensure its products meet
standards for security, such as the Common Criteria.316 These
decisions may be more costly, but can benefit the public in ways that
that the market does not capture.
Relying on the efficiency and externalities rationales has led
to proposals that government use its procurement power to adopt
open source code instead of commercial, off-the-shelf products.317
315
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From an efficiency standpoint, it is well-established that the quality
of open source code, such as Apache, can be comparable to that
produced by private firms.318 However, the cost of open source code
is significantly lower, especially when the nonrivalrous nature of
open source code is considered.319
From an externalities standpoint, there are several reasons for
the government to prefer open source code over proprietary code.
First, government use of open source code can lead to public benefits
through free access to this code. For example, once the government
develops or purchases open source code for one agency, department,
or school, it can then be used by the rest of government for free.
Additionally, this code can be freely adopted by the general public
and would serve as an infrastructure others could use and build upon.
A second externality to consider is the more innovative nature of
open source code resulting from the fewer restrictions on its use as
compared to proprietary code.320 Third, the open source movement’s
government spending to support open source code). Contra David S. Evans &
Bernard Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-Source Software: A
Solution in Search of a Problem, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=313202
(May 21, 2002); Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for
Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319081 (last modified Nov.
2002) (arguing that government should generally not favor open source software
over commercial software).
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public development process allows for a plurality of influences
because it is not dominated by any one firm or country.321 Finally,
open source code is transparent. This allows government and society
to easily examine code.322
The "political" property of code is analogous to the
transparency we require in government legislation.323 For example,
transparency in filtering software allows the public to determine the
rules for excluding sites.324 Already, governments such as China,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are
beginning to adopt open source code.325 For example, the ministries
of culture, defense, and education in France are switching to Linux
from Microsoft, Sun, and Lotus.326 Their reasons are that open
source code is politically palatable, technically superior, and cheaper.
The political reasons include concerns about the influence of the
United States on their domestic software industry, national pride, and
the well-known security flaws in Microsoft’s products. The
objections to this proposal are largely that government is interfering
321
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in private markets and that government is taking money away from
private industry. The criticisms are both legitimate, but society is
better off if this code is freely provided than by purchasing the code.
By providing this code, the government is creating an infrastructure
that others can build upon, thereby creating new innovative forms of
code. In the end, the government’s effort will create more innovative
applications, instead of perhaps wasting money on duplicative code.
C. Using Tax Expenditures
The government’s power of taxation is another tool for
shaping code. In using its power of taxation, government can reduce
or increase an individual’s or firm’s tax burden to create incentives
for certain behavior. This section discusses how a reduction of the
tax burden through tax expenditures can induce certain behavior
thereby allowing the government to both support the development of
code generally and shape code in a particular fashion.
The government can reduce the tax liability for individuals or
firms to encourage an activity or use of a product. This reduction in
tax liability is effectively a substitute for government spending and is
termed a tax expenditure.327 The term tax expenditure highlights that
the loss of tax revenue is equivalent to government spending.328 Tax
expenditures are commonly thought of as tax incentives or
loopholes.329 They serve many purposes, but are a popular method
for addressing societal concerns.330
327
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The use of tax expenditures to shape code is analogous to
direct spending by the federal government. It follows that the same
justification for using a tax expenditure also supports the
establishment of a direct funded government program.331
Commonly, this justification of government intervention is based on
a form of market failure. Different reasons exist as to why
government may choose to use tax expenditures instead of direct
spending to shape code for a particular purpose. First, there are
jurisdictional differences between tax expenditures and direct
spending. This refers to differences in the responsibility over the
measure within the executive branch.332 When government uses a
tax expenditure, the responsibility falls to the Treasury Department
and the Internal Revenue Service for its administration.333 In
contrast, direct spending requires an agency within the executive
branch to administer the program.
This suggests that tax
expenditures are best used when the administrative costs of
establishing and maintaining a spending program are high.334
Additionally, administration of a program by the Treasury and IRS
usually results in strict eligibility requirements because they tend to
limit deductions.335 Moreover, the Treasury and IRS usually do not
have the expertise or the interest in the effectiveness of the
program.336 Therefore, a tax expenditure is appropriate when a
program does not require continued administrative oversight and
discretion.337
increasingly been used to promote social policy goals instead of business
investment). The total tax expenditures for fiscal year 2002 will be over six
hundred billion dollars. See Office of Management and Budget, Table 22-4. Tax
Expenditures by Function, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2002/bud22_4.html (last visited Jun. 27, 2002).
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Another reason for government’s choice of tax expenditures
is that using them produces psychological and political benefits. In
contrast to a direct spending program, a tax expenditure has much
lower visibility.338 It is not represented by a government agency,
rather it is hidden in the tax code. A tax expenditure is not viewed as
government rewarding a few firms, but is instead seen as
encouraging private decision-making.339
As a result, many
politicians who regard themselves as fiscally conservative would
rather use a tax expenditure than support another “big government
spending program”. This is a key component to the popularity of tax
expenditures.340 Nevertheless, a tax expenditure is still government
spending. Essentially, virtually any tax expenditure provision could
be rewritten as a direct spending program.341
There are several objections to using tax expenditures. First,
critics argue that tax expenditures are not equitable. They are of
little use to firms or individuals with low tax liability. A related
objection is that the benefits of tax expenditures unfairly go to those
with the highest tax liability.342 For individuals and firms with little
tax liability or firms subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), a
tax expenditure would be of no value. However, in these cases,
legislators can utilize a refundable, taxable credit, which is
effectively a direct grant.343 Thus, this type of tax expenditure does
not discriminate against those with little tax liability. Secondly, the
benefits of tax expenditures accrue to those with the highest tax
liability.344 In some cases, this can serve as a stimulus to change
practices to gain the full benefit of the tax expenditure. If it is
considered unfair that some beneficiaries with high tax liability are
reaping the lion’s share of the benefits, the tax expenditure program
can be limited. Limits still provide incentives for behavior, but allow
the government to ensure that a few taxpayers are not unjustly
rewarded. An additional objection is that tax expenditures are not
338
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340
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efficient, but rather merely reward behavior that would have resulted
anyway. Therefore, tax expenditures produce a windfall.345 This
objection also targets direct spending, which is the alternative to a
tax expenditure. However, it is possible to limit the windfall by
making the tax expenditure incremental in structure. For example,
by requiring that a taxpayer’s activities exceed that of previous years
to prevent a windfall, only marginal improvements would be
rewarded.346 Critics also object that further tax expenditures will
place too high of an administrative burden on the IRS.347 This seems
unlikely given that the IRS already handles hundreds of billions of
dollars in tax expenditures involving numerous subjects such as
energy, natural resources, agriculture, housing, and transportation
etc. . ..348 Moreover, instead of creating a new agency or department
for a direct spending program, tax expenditures are likely to result in
lower overall administrative costs by placing the burden on the IRS
which already administers tax policy.
The final objection is that the tax code should not be used for
social policy even when supporting technological development.
Instead, the government should look toward direct funding.349 Stated
another way, the tax code focuses on raising revenue and not on
social policy. These incentives are likely to further complicate the
tax code and lead people to lose faith in it. While this argument is
valid, the reality is that the tax code has long been an instrument of
social policy. Moreover, society supports this approach.350 In fact,
345
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according to Zelinsky, tax expenditures are a better way of
communicating social policy to middle-income individuals and small
businesses than direct spending. This is true because the existing
information networks of tax professionals will communicate
information regarding tax expenditure.351 In contrast, the transaction
costs are high for individuals and firms who try to find and utilize
direct spending programs set up by the government.
Tax expenditures have long been used to support
technological development, e.g., tax credits for research and
development as well as proposed legislation to provide tax credit for
the acquisition of information technologies.352 Other tax credits
attempt to shape specific technologies.
For example, tax
expenditures support alternative fuels, hazardous waste facilities,
electric vehicles, and even research and development activities.353
Consider the Orphan Drug Act, which seeks to stimulate the research
and development of drugs for rare diseases through both tax
expenditures and direct research grants.354 This intervention is
justified because rare diseases are seen as unprofitable by the
pharmaceutical industry; therefore, industry requires an incentive for
research and development.355 Moreover, direct grants are used to
fund clinical testing programs for orphan drugs. The FDA
administers this program. In contrast, the tax expenditures allow a
tax credit equal to fifty percent of the qualified clinical testing
expenses for the taxable year.356 However, the drug must first be
generally A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 164 (1912); F.P. Ramsey, A
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351
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1998, available at http://www.nap.edu/issues/15.2/whang.htm. Senator Lieberman
has proposed this tax credit as a stimulus for the economy. See Joe Lieberman,
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designated as an orphan drug by the FDA.357 Here, the tax
expenditure requires a modest amount of cooperation between the
applicable federal agency with the expertise, the FDA, and the
Treasury department to meet the goal of stimulating research.
The government could use tax expenditures to shape the
development of code.358 For example, government could encourage
the development of code to protect minors online, e.g., filtering
software, which prevents minors from gaining access to
inappropriate content. Government intervention into this market is
justified because the current products, including PICS, are expensive,
difficult to use, and not very effective.359 Moreover, there is a
demand by parents for a code-based solution to the problem of
minors gaining access to indecent material.
The justification for tax expenditures over a direct spending
program rests largely on three reasons. First, tax expenditures would
not appear to be interfering in the market for the current products.
Moreover, the problems of favoritism and picking “winners” for
direct funding could be avoided. Second, the administrative cost for
this program would be modest, as there are only a few firms that
would be eligible for this expenditure. Finally, tax expenditures are
much more politically palatable because they are not viewed as tax
and spend. The consequences of this proposal would be subsidizing
vendors. This could overcome the current stalemate, where parents
don’t buy the code because it’s overpriced, and developers cannot
357
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earn enough revenue to improve their code, because of their low
acceptance. Thus, tax expenditures could lead to a reduction in cost
for users while providing financial incentives for developers to
improve their products.360
D. Funding Education and Training
The purpose of government funding can vary from providing
information about an activity or product to proactively attempting to
change behavior. Such intervention is justified because of the lack of
information on the part of the general public.361 In this section, we
show how educational campaigns can shape code. After discussing
the criticisms of funding educational campaigns, we show how
government can shape code through educational campaigns. We
focus on two such campaigns. The first type of campaign is a byproduct of government’s employee training, while the second
approach involves direct funding of educational campaigns.
Criticism of government funded educational campaigns
largely centers on the effectiveness of these programs. Critics argue
that millions of dollars are spent on educational programs that
provide no tangible benefits.362 One notable article on educational
campaigns identified three problems with their effectiveness. First,
not all behaviors can be corrected by educational campaigns. “Given
human frailties, some accidents simply cannot be prevented.”363
360
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Second, campaigns should focus on one-time actions instead of
trying to alter patterns of behavior. Third, changes come “slowly,
modestly, and often expensively.” While these criticisms are valid,
newer and more sophisticated approaches to educational campaigns
have been shown to be more effective.
One way to raise the effectiveness of a campaign is to make it
less costly. An example of this is the use of educational campaigns
that are by-products of the government’s efforts to educate its own
employees.364 This occurs because of the ease of diffusing
information through the Internet, essentially a low-cost educational
campaign. An excellent example of this is the web site usability.gov.
Its original purpose was to assist people working with the National
Cancer Institute’s (NCI) web pages, which provided a methodology
for how to improve the design of web sites based on NCI’s
experience. NCI recognized that its web site was useful to people
outside of NCI and proceeded to make it available to both other
federal agencies and the general public. The cost of making this
information available to others via the Internet was extremely low.
As a result, usability.gov is now an important resource for web
designers on how to make web sites more usable, useful, and
accessible.
This example shows how effective educational
campaigns can flow from the government’s efforts to educate its
employees.365
The effectiveness of educational campaigns can vary depending upon
whether the government is seeking to merely inform consumers
about risks or attempting to change the behavior of people.366 While
informing consumers is a straightforward process, changing behavior
is much more difficult. After all, firms have long tried to persuade
consumers to purchase their products with mixed success.
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that educational campaigns
can in fact change behavior where other forms of regulation would
fail.367 Today’s educational campaigns use much more sophisticated
364
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marketing techniques. The same principles and practices firms used
for marketing are now being adapted to bring about social change,
such as public health or safety. This approach is aptly named social
marketing. It has been applied to a variety of social issues including
health, education, safety, and the environment.368 Despite these new
tools, the effectiveness of social marketing depends on the problem it
is trying to solve. Clearly, changing fundamental behaviors,
attitudes, and values is much more difficult than altering a single
behavior. Nevertheless, in some cases, social marketing has proven
successful in changing behavior.369
The government currently operates educational campaigns for
code which provide information to help with consumer decisions.370
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains information for
consumers on e-commerce and the Internet.
This includes
information on buying low cost computers, protecting minors online,
and the many types of online scams.371 One notable example is the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of fake web sites to teach
investors about potential scams.372 The fake web sites promoted
financial opportunities with the potential for tremendous financial
gains. But once an investor tries to invest, they are led to a page that
says, “[i]f you responded to an investment idea like this … you could
get scammed!"373 The page also provides further information how to
research investment offers and what to do if you are scammed.
Another example of an educational campaign is the Energy Star
specifications that allow consumers to identify energy-efficient
368
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products. This program has led to substantial purchases of energy
efficient products.374
One example of a proposed code-based government
education campaign concerns the common security problem, which
occurs when people do not update their computers and properly
utilize code-based solutions such as firewalls and anti-virus software.
To persuade people to use these tools, the government is preparing to
develop an educational campaign directed at home and small
business users.375 Another similar campaign could focus on limiting
the use of social engineering. This approach does not focus on the
code, but instead gains information to bypass the security of
computer users.376 Such an approach may involve tricking people
into revealing passwords by pretending to be a technician. The best
countermeasure here is an education campaign, which would likely
require social marketing techniques.377 However, it could result in
fewer security problems with code. Examples of basic security
precautions that could be addressed include using strong passwords
with a mixture of alphanumeric characters, changing passwords
frequently, and educating employees about the risks of email
attachments.378
IV. SHAPING CODE THROUGH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Government can use intellectual property rights, such as
patents and copyright, to shape code. In this first section, we note
briefly that the government may modify intellectual property (IP)
rights to further innovation and preserve dissemination in code. A
detailed study of how the scope of IP rights can be modified in order
to shape the development of code is a vast and important topic that is
374
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beyond the scope of this work. In keeping this our brief foray into IP
rights and the development of code, the second section focuses on
the use of patent pools and compulsory licensing to foster the
dissemination of code or content. The third section focuses on the
appropriate policy for transferring government created code to the
private sector; this can have a significant impact on the development
of code.
A. Revising Intellectual Property Rights
Intellectual property rights differ from conventional property
rights in one aspect: significant society benefits accrue from
intellectual property that is not privatized. Free flowing information
allows people to build upon the intellectual efforts of others. This is
understood at the outset from Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 in the U.S.
Constitution, which only permits limited protection for intellectual
property rights in order to foster both creation and dissemination
thereby promot[ing] “the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."379
Thus, the government’s limited protection of intellectual property
plays an important role in stimulating innovation, preserving
dissemination and fostering cumulative innovation.380
Intellectual property rights for code have historically been
different for hardware and software. Patent law has traditionally
protected the hardware components, and has recently joined
copyright law in protecting software. This change has occurred, not
because of the actions of legislators, but because of judges.381
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, now allow the patenting of software.382
379
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However, copyright protection of code has not decreased. In fact,
legislators have increased the duration of copyright protection with
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.383 This act
retroactively extended the duration of copyrights an additional
twenty years.384 Proponents argued that this extension would
encourage investment in existing copyright works as well as
encouraging the creation of new works, because of the longer
exclusivity period.385
A number of scholars have argued that current intellectual
property rights are too strong and actually discourage innovation.386
They believe that intellectual property laws need to facilitate the
sharing of information to further innovation. In keeping with this
idea, Lessig proposes limiting the duration of copyright protection
and requiring renewal every five years.387 If the copyright is not
renewed, the work falls into the public domain. He also proposes
that, in order to gain copyright protection for software, the author
must provide the source code so it may enter the public domain upon
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expiration of the copyright.388 The net effect would be to place more
content and code into the public domain for other to build on.
Evaluating and justifying the revision of intellectual property
rights is difficult for two main reasons. First, it is difficult to
empirically ascertain whether intellectual property protection is too
strong or too weak. Concepts such as innovation or a public
commons for knowledge are difficult to compare as to their costs and
benefits. Second, the modification of intellectual property rights
affects a fundamental social and economic characteristic of
society.389
Individuals and firms rely on these notions and
definitions of property in their actions. Therefore, any change
undermines these assumptions.390
Nevertheless, for political
economy reasons, the long-term trend in copyright law toward more
protection has not slowed down.391
B. Patent Pools and Compulsory Licensing
A second, more tangible and immediate method of shaping
code is by using patent pools and compulsory licensing, which
allows the government to force a party to license their copyright or
patent. As a result, another party or the government can make, use,
and sell the affected content or technology. This allows government
to expand the dissemination of intellectual property. In the United
States, the government has required compulsory licensing of
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copyrights, but generally not patents.392 The prevailing justifications
for the use of patent pools and/or compulsory licensing are high
transactions costs, public interest, and the need to continue to
promote downstream innovation. These types of licensing schemes
are used to reduce transactions costs.393 In some industries, there are
large numbers of intellectual property rights holders that must be
contracted with to develop or use their property rights. These large
numbers result in high transaction costs and reduce the incentive to
use intellectual property.
Government intervention seeks to address high transaction
costs by using patent pools or compulsory licensing, which reduces
the costs of haggling over individual transactions as well as
providing an administrative method to ensure the proper parties are
compensated. For instance, the government requires compulsory
licensing of the retransmission of broadcast signals by cable. The
rationale is that transaction costs would make it impractical for the
cable company to pay royalties to each individual copyright owner of
Through compulsory licensing, the
a broadcast signal.394
government reduces the transaction costs for all parties and promotes
the growth of new technology by ensuring an adequate supply of
content.395 The objection to using compulsory licensing rests largely
on the costs of government action as compared with private action.
Opponents of government mandated compulsory licensing prefer
privately established organizations that lower transactions costs, such
392
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as the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP).396 These groups argue that private organizations have
more flexibility in their licensing decisions.397
Additionally,
government action is subject to interested parties that may
manipulate the rules for their own benefits.398
The existence of technology vital to the public interest,
examples of which include public safety, national defense,
agriculture, environment, and antitrust, is the second rationale for
compulsory licensing.399 The justification for compulsory licensing
is that the public interests are so great as to make it necessary to
ensure public access to the products through compulsory licensing.
A classic example is a life-saving drug that is sold at a high price.400
A host country may choose to use compulsory licensing to bring
down the price of a drug. The objection to this approach is that a
compulsory license leads to a loss of monopoly power, which is an
essential condition for an intellectual property right, resulting in
lower revenue for the producer. More generally, the government’s
use of this power will reduce a firm’s incentive to innovate.
Consequently, if firms believe they will be subject to compulsory
licensing for a product, they will not develop it.401 In effect, the
overuse of this method could actually lead to fewer technologies that
address various public interests.402
A final objection to compulsory licensing is its administrative
costs. The necessary legislative and regulatory proceedings can take
time because government does not move quickly. Conversely, in the
area of code, technological development is rapid. As a result,
396
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compulsory licensing may reduce the incentive for firms to develop
new business models that touch upon public interests because of the
risk that they may be subject to compulsory licensing.403
There are a number of possible uses for compulsory licensing
for code. For example, to reduce transactions costs and promote the
growth of new digital music technologies, the government could
require compulsory licensing of music in a digital format.404 The
critical issue is whether government intervention is really needed
because of the lack of private action in permitting transactions of
digitally formatted music. In addition, compulsory licensing could
be used in a variety of ways for the public interest. As an example,
one potential remedy in the Microsoft antitrust trial was the licensing
of Microsoft Windows.405 This licensing could be justified by the
unique and important nature of the Windows operating system to
society. Proponents would have to show how this licensing would
increase innovation in the software industry. Yet another compelling
reason for compulsory licensing, besides innovation and competition,
would be for code that protects privacy, national security, or minors.
In this case, a compulsory licensing scheme could be justified to
ensure that the product was widely disseminated. However, in using
such a scheme, the government would have to consider the
administrative costs as well as the potential adverse effects on
innovation – if firms are not adequately compensated by such
licensing schemes, they may avoid developing code that addresses
societal concerns.
C. Transferring Intellectual Property to the Private Sector
The government is capable of creating very innovative code.
However, government is generally not the ideal institution to provide
technical support, maintenance, and further enhancement of code.
403
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Instead, this activity is better accomplished by other institutions such
as firms, consortia, or the open source movement.406 For very
innovative code to become useful to society, it is often necessary to
transfer it to the private sector.407 Consequently, there are a number
of laws that require government and public universities to support the
transfer of its technology to the private sector. Additionally, federal
agencies, such as the NSF, seek to have their sponsored research
commercialized.408
To promote technology transfer, the government has enacted
laws that allow for the transfer of intellectual property rights to the
private sector.409 The first notable law was the Stevenson-Wylder
Technology Innovation Act, which made technology transfer an
integral activity for federal laboratories.410 This was followed by the
Bayh-Dole Act, which today allows universities and firms to patent
and license the results of government-sponsored research.411 These
laws represented a shift from public ownership of governmentsponsored research toward private appropriation,412 and has meant
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that inventions, previously in the public domain for anyone to use,
may now be patented with arguably limited use.413
The standard justification for technology transfer laws is
promoting commercialization. These laws provide firms with the
necessary intellectual property protection to support the eventual
commercial development of a technology.
Firms argue that
technologies developed by the public sector or government are
immature and in need of further refining and testing before entering
the marketplace. However, such further development is risky.
Therefore, firms need the protection of intellectual property rights
through technology transfer laws which encourage them to accept
risk in the development process.414 Without intellectual property
protection, firms argue that government-sponsored technologies
would languish in the public domain in their unrefined form.
The history of the NCSA Mosaic web server and web
browser highlighted two different approaches the government could
take in transferring its technology. In one instance, the government
licensed the technology to the private sector, and in the other
instance, the government placed the technology in the public domain.
In the case of the NCSA Mosaic web browser, the University of
Illinois licensed out the code for several million dollars.415 The
dominant web browser today, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, is built
upon the NCSA Mosaic web browser source code.416 The second
method of technology transfer consisted of placing the NCSA
Mosaic web server into the public domain. This method earned the
university zero dollars. However, the most popular web server
today, Apache, available for free to the public, had its origins in the
NCSA Mosaic web server source code.417
The Apache example challenges the prevailing view that
intellectual property protection is needed to encourage the
1663, 1663 (1996) (providing an historical overview of the government’s
technology transfer policy).
413
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commercialization of government-sponsored research.418 By placing
the NCSA Mosaic web server into the public domain, the
government encouraged the dissemination and continued innovation
of the web server. From this, individuals and firms incrementally
and cumulatively improved the original source code created by
NCSA. On the whole, generalizing and passing on the efficacy of
placing all government-sponsored innovations in the public domain
is unsupported by our two case studies. However, it is clear that
definitive conclusions, either for or against intellectual property
protection for government-sponsored research, are not currently
possible. Moreover, there is limited empirical evidence on this
subject.419 It is clear which scenario benefits the University of
Illinois. However, it is not as clear which scenario benefits
society.420 Perhaps society would have been better off if the NCSA
Mosaic web browser was placed into the public domain instead of
being licensed.421 This could have encouraged a larger number of
entities to build upon the NCSA Mosaic web browser.
418
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The Apache case study also challenges the assumption that
firms are the only entity capable of commercializing code. The
prevailing logic for technology transfer laws assumes that only firms
are capable of turning government sponsored research into useful
products. However, there is another institution that is capable of
producing useful code, the open source movement. The open source
movement’s reliance on both individual volunteers as well as firms
to develop useful code has been validated in many projects including
Apache. These products are not niche products, but rather products
around which the computing industry is increasingly being based.
Accordingly, the government’s efforts at technology transfer must
recognize the value and strength of the open source movement. To
further innovation and dissemination of code, the government should
ensure the open source movement has access to governmentsponsored code. We propose, as a general rule, that government
funded research should place its code in the public domain.422
Placing code in the public domain is the least restrictive method for
both preserving access while permitting downstream intellectual
property protection.423 This allows both firms and the open source
movement to build upon the government's code. Moreover, firms
can still seek intellectual property protection for any code that they
have spent effort on improving or refining.424 This policy is
422
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consistent with technology transfer laws, such as the Bayh-Dole Act,
which seeks to further the utilization of government-sponsored
research.425 The main objection to this proposal is that all parties are
treated equally, including foreign competitors to American
companies.
One use of intellectual property protection during technology
transfer is allowing the government to provide preferential treatment
to American firms. This is one of the many stated rationales for the
Bayh-Dole Act.426 In response, we argue that preferential treatment
is just one of the many underlying rationales for technology transfer.
The main rationale behind technology transfer is ensuring the
utilization of government research. Moreover, the rise of the open
source movement, which is based upon volunteers around the world,
complicates any preferential treatment for American firms. As an
example, the development of Apache relied on developers from
around the world.427 The effect of preferential treatment toward
American firms is to ensure code is not available to the open source
movement. For example, American software firms have criticized
the National Security Agency (NSA) for developing an enhanced
secure version of the open source operating system Linux. 428
Nevertheless, NSA has decided to continue working on its secure
version of Linux as part of its mission to understand and improve
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computer security.429 The open source community has applauded the
NSA’s work and has begun utilizing their code. 430
The policy of placing code into the public domain may be
difficult for universities to pursue because licensing brings
universities much needed revenue. Therefore, it is difficult to turn
away that money, and instead, place code into the public domain. In
fact, the University of Illinois had a number of companies seeking to
license the NCSA Mosaic web browser. Abandoning that potential
licensing opportunity would go against the nature and mission of a
university technology transfer office. Thus, for this policy to become
widely used, it will be necessary to change the mindset in technology
transfer offices.431 Currently, universities are not “distinguishing
between times when it’s important to have a patent in place to get
something disseminated and times when it’s not. They’re just
looking to see if they can make money,” according to Eisenberg.432
As the NCSA Mosaic web server example shows, the benefits of
placing code into the public domain may not flow directly to the
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university, and it may take a long time for the benefits to accrue to
society.433
Already, the government is slowly beginning to support the
open source movement as an institution capable of developing code.
While the open source movement has developed a significant amount
of the code for the Internet, it also is playing a role in
biotechnology.434 This has led the National Institute of Health (NIH)
to begin studying the appropriate level of intellectual property
protection needed for its research tools. One such research tool is
bioinformatics code. A working group of the NIH has recommended
that the NIH should promote the free distribution of research tools.435
Other researchers have been more aggressive in calling for the use of
open source code.436
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has taken a very different approach than
traditional scholarship which focuses on how code affects a
particular societal concern. Our goal was to show the many methods
available to government to influence the development of code. To
this end, we analyzed a number of different regulatory and fiscal
actions government can take to shape code. For each possible action,
we discussed potential regulatory and technological issues that could
affect the success of the action. We believe our analysis will be
invaluable to scholars and policymakers seeking to shape the
development of code.
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In considering regulatory actions we noted that prohibitions
can be an effective method of regulation, but current export
prohibitions on encryption code are impractical.437 Similarly, we
discussed the regulatory trade-offs with technology-forcing
regulation and illustrated this by analyzing the CDA as a technologyforcing regulation.438 Our analysis led us to criticize the current
policy of mandating digital broadcasting technologies, because of
their vague benefits.439 Our discussion of liability led us to conclude
that modification of liability systems can result in more secure and
safer code.440
However, we identified flaws in a proposed
government policy to create a more secure code by attempting to
develop an insurance system for cybersecurity.441 A final key point
was the need for a comprehensive regulatory strategy for code. Just
as other regulatory objects, such as biotechnology and automobiles,
have a regulatory framework, the same approach is needed for
code.442
Our consideration of government’s fiscal approaches led us to
offer a number of policy recommendations. We discussed how
government can shape code by funding its research and
development.443 We also suggest that government should use its
procurement power to favor open standards and open source code.444
Such a policy is consistent with the government’s goals of spending
its resources efficiently while considering social and environmental
externalities. Finally, we argue that government can further
innovation by promoting technology transfer by placing its code into
the public domain.445 This allows a wide variety of parties to build
upon and refine the work accomplished by government on the behalf
of its citizens.
Future scholarship will more fully examine each of the
measures discussed in this article. We encourage and look forward
to this, because it is our belief that code can serve as a beneficial
regulatory mechanism. To this end, we have attempted to analyze
the various methods that policymakers may use to guide and promote
the development of code that contributes to our society.
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